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ARTICLES
NATIVE AMERICAN TEAM NAMES
IN ATHLETICS: IT'S TIME TO
TRADE THESE MARKS
Paul E. Loving*
The field is almost limitless from which to select words for use as
trade-mark, and one who uses debatable marks does so at the
peril that his mark may not be entitled to registration.
-Judge Lenroott
. INTRODUCTION
During 1991-92, teams with Native American names2 experienced
remarkable on-field success. The Atlanta Braves played in the 1991 and
1992 World Series, the Washington Redskins won Super Bowl XXVI, and
the Florida State University Seminoles spent most of the season ranked first
in both the Associated Press and United Press International college football
polls.
These on-field accomplishments, however, occurred during a barrage
of protests by Native American individuals and groups. Many Native
Americans are outraged by the way they are portrayed in athletics. They
perceive stereotypical portrayals such as the University of Illinois' mascot
* B.S., 1990, University of California at Los Angeles; J.D. candidate, 1993, University of
Oregon School of Law, Associate Editor, Oregon Law Review. Upon graduation, the author will
serve as a Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Edwin J. Peterson, Justice of the Oregon Supreme
Court.
This Article was written for Professor Dom Vetri's Spring 1992 Intellectual Property
Course. The author wishes to thank his wife Kim who initially recognized the problem with
Native American team names. Sandy Robb, a close friend and colleague, and those individuals
and groups across the country who provided me with research materials, also deserve special
recognition. Copyright Paul E. Loving 1992.
1. In re Riverbank Canning, 95 F.2d 327, 329 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
2. The phrases "Native American team name" and "Native American name" are used
somewhat loosely in this Article. These phrases also encompass slang, stereotypical, and
offensive references to Native Americans such as "Redskins." In addition, "team names" should
be read to include "team logos."
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Chief miniwek,3 the tomahawk chop,4 the Florida State University
mascot,5 the Washington Redskins' fight song,' and the sacrilegious
treatment of Native American religious symbols and practices at sporting
events7 as demeaning and humiliating. The most insulting treatment
concerns the use of Native American names for athletic teams.
This Article contends a legal remedy is available to opponents of
Native American team names under the Federal Trademark Act ("Lanham
Act").' Those opponents could initiate a trademark cancellation proceeding
to deprive an athletic team of the protections and benefits its team name
receives under the Lanham Act. By eliminating a team's ability to enforce
its trademarks in an infringement action, cancellation would decrease the
value of the trademarks so dramatically a team would likely abandon them
voluntarily. Further, if federal registration is canceled, common law
3. The "Chief' wears facial paint and a headdress and performs dances at University of
Illinois games. The University Of Illinois' Director of Academic Affirmative Action described
Chief liniwek as "an affront to the dignity of all Indians," and Senator Paul Simon signed a
student petition to abolish Chief Illiniwek. See Franz Lindz, Not A Very Sporting Symbol:
Indians Have Ceased to be Appropriate Team Mascots, SPORTS ILL., Sept. 17, 1990, at 8.
4. The "chop" originated at Florida State University during the 1970's and gained national
attention during the Braves' 1991 season. The "chop" involves moving one's hand in an up and
down chopping motion. Some fans hold foam tomahawks in their hand, others act as if they are
holding a tomahawk.
The "chop" phenomena caught on in Kansas City at Chiefs' games, in Washington at
Redskins' games, and at high school games across the country. After the conclusion of the 1991
World Series, Ted Turner, owner of the Braves, stated he "wouldn't mind getting rid of the
tomahawk chop." However, during the Series he and his wife-to-be, Jane Fonda, participated in
the "chop." Dan Burkhart, Turner Won't Change Braves' Name, But Wouldn't Mind Stopping
the Chop, ATLANTA J., Dec. 3, 1991, at F8.
5. The Seminoles' mascot rides on horseback "onto the football field jn a headdress and
plant[s] a flaming spear into the ground." Rick Reily, Let's Bust Those Chops, SPORTS ILL., OCL
28, 1991, at 110.
6. The lyrics to the 1938 version of the song are: "Hail to the Redskins, hail victory! Braves
on the warpath, fight for old D.C.! Scalp 'em, swamp 'em, we will take 'em big score. Read 'em,
weep 'em, touchdown, we want heap more!" Lyrics adopted in the 1970"s, in response to Native
American protests, are: "Hail to the Redskins! Hail victory! Braves on the Warpath, fight for
old D.C.! Run or pass and score-we want a lot more! Beat 'em Swamp 'em Touchdown-let
the points soar! Fight on, Fight on-Till you have won, Sons of Washington!!" See Hail to the
Redskins, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1984, at N7.
7. See infra notes 288-90 and accompanying text.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). The Lanham Act is applicable because professional and
collegiate team names are federally registered trademarks. For comprehensive and excellent
treatments of the history of United States trademark law, see 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETrION §§ 5.1-5.4 (2d ed. 1984); FRANK I. SCHEC'ER, THE
HISTORIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING To TRADE-MARuKs (1925); and Sidney A.
Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1975).
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trademark will not provide any protection to a Native American team name.
Although this Article focuses on professional athletics, its theories are
equally applicable to any Native American team name which is a registered
trademark.'
11. NATIVE AMERICAN TEAM NAMES
Native American team names are common in professional, collegiate,
and high school athletics."0 Professional teams include: Atlanta Braves
(baseball), Chicago Blackhawks (hockey), Cleveland Indians (baseball),
Kansas City Chiefs (football), and Washington Redskins (football).
Collegiate teams include: Florida State University Seminoles, St. Johns
University Redmen, and Miami of Ohio University Redskins." Discuss-
ing collegiate sports, one author notes:
In reality, if all names associated with the American Indian
were grouped together, that category would be the unquestionable
winner [of the most often used nickname]. In addition to Indians,
such labels as Redmen, Warriors, Savages, Braves & Chiefs show
up frequently as athletic mascots. These names still remain
popular despite the efforts of minority groups around the country
to separate any reference to the American Indian from college
9. The portion of this Article discussing common law trademark would also apply to those
trademarks never registered, as well as trademarks whose registration was canceled.
Although this Article focuses on four professional teams, they certainly do not comprise an
exhaustive list of racially offensive trademarks. One may wonder how broadly this theory could
be applied. In particular, could people of Nordic ancestry challenge the trademark of professional
football's Minnesota Vikings or people of Irish ancestry challenge professional basketball's
Boston Celtic trademark? What about a sexist team name? See John R. Fuller & Elisabeth Anne
Manning, Violence and Sexism in College Mascots and Symbols: A Typology, 15 FREE INQUIRY
IN CREATIVE SOCIOLOGY 61 (1987) (examples of women's team names: Mercer University
Teddy Bears and University of Arkansas at Monticello Cotton Blossoms); D. Stanley Eitzen &
Maxine Baca Zinn, The De-athietization of Women: The Naming and Gender Marking of
Collegiate Sport Teams, 6 SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT J. 362 (1989).
Without expressing an opinion on any of these particular trademarks, the author believes
any petitioner who can demonstrate that a trademark meets one of the prohibitions of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(a) should prevail in an action to cancel a federally registered trademark. See infra note
100 and accompanying text.
10. This author's high school team has a Native American team name, "Warriors," and had
a Native American mascot until 1989 when the mascot was banned at the recommendation of the
Michigan Civil Rights Commission. See Letter from Brother Rice High School to John Roy
Castillo, Director Dept. of Civil Rights (Feb. 3, 1989) (on file with author).
II. See generally THE BLUE BOOK OF SR. COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY AND JUNIOR &
COMMUNITY COLLEGE ATHLnECS (Ansel W. Tinkered., 1991).
1992]
4 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMElVT LAW JOURNAL [Vol.13
sports.
12
Apologists rely on several rationales to support retaining the current
Native American names:13 (1) "[tlhe [locale] has a tradition of involve-
12. RAY FRANKS, WHAT'S IN A NICKNAME? XPLORING TIE JUNGLE OF COLLEGE ATHL C
MASCOTS 10 (1982).
13. MICHIGAN DEPARTmENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS, MICHIGAN CIVL RIGHTS COMMiSSION
REPORT ON USE OF NICKNAME, LoOs, AND MASCOTS DEPICTING NATIVE AMERICAN PEOPLE
IN MICHIoAN EDUCATION INSTrtmoNs 19 (1988) [hereinafter MICwHGAN COMMISSION].
Contrary to this claim, several groups and individuals have complained. See infra notes 30-67 and
accompanying text. It is true, however, that Native American team names and symbols have been
used for a many years. For example, the Cleveland Indians will celebrate their 125th anniversary
in 1994. CLEVELAND INDIANS PRESS GUIDE (1992).
Throughout its history, the team has changed its name several times: 1869 (Forest City),
1889 (Spiders), 1900 (Blues), 1902 (Broncos), 1903 (Naps), 1915 (Indians). When the team
decided to change its name in 1903, a local newspaper sponsored a contest to choose the new
team name. Cleveland residents chose the name Naps in honor of one of the team's premiere
players, Napoleon Lajoie. In 1914, Lajoie was released and a new name was needed. I&
Once again, through a contest sponsored by a local newspaper, the franchise chose its new
name based on fan balloting. One fan suggested the name Indians to honor a Native American
who had played for the franchise when it was known as the Spiders. The player, Louis
Sockalexis, was the first Native American professional baseball player. Sockalexis lived from
1871 to 1913 and was a Penobscot Indian. He attended college at Holy Cross College where he
played intercollegiate baseball. In 1887, he joined the Cleveland organization. Sockalexis only
played three seasons of professional baseball. Id.
The team has been named the Cleveland Indians for 77 years. And is often referred to as
the "Tribe" and its players as the 'Tribesmen." The team's present logo is a comical picture of
a Native American who wears a headband with one feather, and who displays a large grin. The
logo was designed by Bob Fishel in the late 1940's. MICHIGAN COMMISSION at 5. At that time,
Fishel was the secretary of the American Baseball League. Of the logo, Fishel stated, "[i]t was
just supposed to be a happy Indian. I don't believe in running down any group or nationality."
Id.
One writer, though, has compared the Cleveland Indians logo, a "grinning-injun," to the
stereotypical black character "Stepin Fetchit." See Rick Reily, Let's Bust Those Chops, SPORTS
ILL, Oct. 28, 1991, at 110. In addition, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission noted, "[e]ven
though a school administration [or in this case a franchise] may make a strong effort to present
a dignified logo, it cannot control the misuse of the image which arises from fans." MICHIGAN
COMMIssION at 21 (for example, "posters, cheers or insults hurled at opposing teams"). Further,
whether the Indians have made a "strong effort" is questionable.
The Washington Redskins also have a long history. The Redskins originally played in
Boston, Massachusetts and were known as the Boston Braves. WASHINGTON REDSKINS PRESS
GUIDE 230 (1991). The team's original owner was George Preston Marshall. During the time
the team played in Boston, the city was also home to the National League baseball franchise
Boston Braves. On July 8, 1933, after a poor season by baseball's Boston Braves, Marshall
changed the name of his football team to the Redskins. Marshall supposedly chose the Redskins
name because "he had always been an admirer of the American Indian and.., one of the team's
coaches was an American Indian." MIcMGAN COMMISSION at 6 (relying on statements by
Marshall's granddaughter, Jordan Price). This argument, though, ignores the teams' old name
which already was a Native American team name. In reality, what Marshall did was expand the
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ment with Indian people;" (2) "(t]he original idea was to honor or pay
tribute to the Indian community;" (3) 'Indian people symbolize positive
character[istics] which include courage, steadfastness and strength, which
an athletic team should emulate;' 4 and (4) "the name and symbol ha[ve]
been used for a long time and no one has complained." 5
In addition, many teams assert changing their team name will destroy
the market for their trademarked goods. 6 This argument is specious
because it conveniently disregards the continued economic vitality of teams
which have dropped their Native American team names. Although no
professional team has abandoned its Native American team name, several
universities have."
offensiveness of his team name by choosing a more offensive term for Native Americans. In no
way does this show admiration for Native Americans.
On February 13, 1937, the fianchise moved to Washington and retained its name.
WASHINGTON REDSKINS PRESS GUIDE 230 (1991). The current Redskins' logo is described as
"an Indian head in profile, dressed in war paint and feathers." Richard Justice, REDSKINS
NOTEBOOK, Washington Entrenched On Nickname, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1991, at B6.
14. The present ownership of the Redskins does not believe the team name is derogatory,
rather, the name symbolizes the honorable characteristics of Native American culture. John
Cooke, the team's executive vice president and son of Redskins owner Jack Kent Cooke, stated:
"[The Redskins name] [ojver the years, [has] come to represent the best of the culture-bravery,
organization [of the Native Americans], the whole works. The name Redskins means football in
Washington. We honor Native Americans. We believe that... [the Redskins name] represents
the finest things in the Indian culture." Leonard Shapiro, Offensive Penalty is Called on
"Redskins": Native Americans Protest the Name, WASH. PosT, Nov. 3, 1991, at D1.
15. MICmHoAN COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 19.
16. See Raad Cawthorn, Baseball Indians Receive Sympathy But No Promises, ATLANTA
CONST., Nov. 22, 1991, at H8 (the president of the Atlanta Braves stated the name change would
be detrimental to the Braves' organization because of "business considerations"). See also
MINcnGAN COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 19 (When faced with the possibility of changing their
team names, "[s]everal administrators [of Michigan schools] raised questions about the cost of
changing names and symbols."); Chuck Haga, Tom Over A Nickname; Some Grand Forks
Residents Fighting School Board's Ban on 'Redskins', STAR TRM., Jan. 20, 1992, at B 1 ("$25,000
to change uniforms and equipment, and remove the Indian head logo painted on the basketball
court floor.").
17. In addition to Stanford University and Dartmouth College, the University of North Dakota
has also changed its Native American team name. See Julia Kazaks, North Dakota Alters Indian
Mascot, STANFORD DAILY, Oct. 27, 1987, at 6.
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A. Stanford Indians
In 1970, twenty-seven Native Americans enrolled at Stanford
University. These students recognized the offensive nature of the
school's team name and brought it to the attention of the University
administration.' 9  The students met with various University officials to
discuss the racist nature of the name and to encourage them to abandon its
use.
20
In 1972, the students presented a pI.tition to the Stanford Ombudsman
urging the University to eliminate its Native American team name, the
mascot "Prince Lightfoot," the offensive dress of the cheerleaders known
as the dollies, the use of the name "Indians" in advertising, and to give aid
to the Stanford Native American program.2 Later that year, "[a]fter a
vote in the student senate and two student referendums," the University
officially dropped the name "Indians."' Unfortunately, there were efforts
to revive it.2?
B. Dartmouth Indians
Dartmouth College was established in 1769 "for the education and
instruction of Youth of the Indian Tribes in the land in reading, writing &
all parts of Learning which shall appear necessary and expedient for
18. See STANFORD AMERICAN INDIAN ORGANIZATION STATIMENT ON "STANFORD INDIAN"
SYmBOL-AtimumN, 1975. The students, twenty-two undergraduate and five graduate, were the
first Native Americans to enroll at Stanford.
19. ILL
20. 1d (Including its use and derivative use by the "[u]niversity administration, athletic
department, bookstore, bike shop, band, dollies [the school's cheerleaders who dressed in Native
American attire] and other groups.").
21. 1972 NATIVE AmIaCAN PammoN.
22. Kazaks, supra note 17, at 6.
23. In addition to an unofficial campaign to bring back the Indian name, Prince Lightfoot has
periodically shown up at Stanford athletic events. See, e.g., Keep 'Chief Offthe Field, STANFORD
DAILY, Oct. 10, 1979, at 4 ("Shortly before the end of the halftime performance [at the
Stanford/U.C.L.A. football game], [Timmi Williams and several large menacing body guards
wearing 'Bring Back Chief Lightfoot' T-Shirts were admitted to the playing field and pompously
paraded around the track to the cheers of many students, alumni and fans."). In an exemplary
stance, the University has re-affirmed its 1972 position stating: "[U]nequivocally ... the Indian
is unacceptable as a mascot and will not be used again." Let There Be No Mistake, STANFORD
DAILY, Oct. 10, 1980, at 7.
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civilizing & Christianizing Children of Pagans .... 24 Its athletic teams
were not called the Indians until the mid-1920's, when "such terminology
simply slipped into newspaper sports page usage with increasing frequen-
cy. P45 The name first appeared on athletic uniforms during the 1928-29
season, but did not appear on football jerseys until 1965.3
In 1972, a Native American student group appeared before the
Dartmouth Alumni Council ("Council") and asked it to abolish the Indians
name and symbol. The Council quickly appointed the "Indian Symbol
Study Committee" to investigate this request.27 After six months of
research, chairman Robert D. Klimarx presented the study to the Council.
He emphasized that "the committee was not simply giving in to another
minority demand. There has been no demand on the part of [the College's]
Native Americans. . . .The Indian symbol may have made sense for
Dartmouth at one time; it does not now. It is an idea whose time has gone
by.
,28
In 1974, the Trustees of Dartmouth College affirmed the Council's
decision stating, "[t]he board considers use of the symbol in any form to
be inconsistent with the present institutional and academic objectives of the
College in advancing Native American education." 9  While neither the
committee nor the trustees would act to officially abolish the name
"Indians," their stance against the name resulted in student and alumni
24. REPORT AD RECOMMENDATION OF TE DARTMOUTH ALUMNI COUNCIL INDIAN SYMBOL
STUDY COMMITTEE 2 (1972) [hereinafter DARTMOUTH REPORT]. Admittedly, though, Dartmouth
was slow to enroll and educate Native Americans. Id. at 3.
25. DARTMOUTH COLLE.E OFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES PRESS RELEASE 2 (June 6,
1972) [hereinafter PRESS RELEASE].
26. Id
27. DARTMOUTH REPORT, supra note 24, at 1.
28. PRESS RELEASE, supra note 25, at 2. However, the committee determined: "Since at no
time in the college's history has the Indian Symbol been adopted by a college governing body,
the committee finds there is nothing to 'repeal' today." Id. Therefore, the committee believed
it would be improper to abandon a symbol never officially adopted. Id. The committee did note
several on- and off-campus groups had voluntarily "cuitail[ed] or eliminat[ed] ... the use [or]
mention of the Indian as a symbol," and expressed their personal pleasure at these efforts. Id. at
3. The committee also distinguished Dartmouth's situation from Stanford's, who two months
earlier had abolished its Indian name, because the Stanford student senate had officially
established the Indian as the school's symbol. I& at 3; see also notes 18-23 and accompanying
text.
29. DARTMOUTH COLLEGE NEWS SERVICE PRESS RELEASE 1 (Oct. 30, 1974). The Trustees,
though, also agreed "no official action be taken to either affirm or eliminate the [Indian] symbol."
Id. at 8.
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protests in favor of retaining the name."
m. RECENT PROTESTS OVER NATIVE
AMERICAN TEAM NAMES
One individual dedicated to eliminating Native American team names
is Tim Giago, editor and publisher of the Lakota Times." Giago, a
member of the Oglala Lakota (Sioux) tribe, has written several editorials
criticizing Native American team names. 2 Giago also has written a
commentary that appeared in Newsweek magazine,33 urging individuals
watching the 1992 Super Bowl to substitute "Blackskins," "Whiteskins," or
"Yellowskins" for "Redskins" any time the team's name was used during
the telecast.' Giago believed this would demonstrate how "demeaning,
degrading and insulting" the name "Redskins" is to Native Americans."
Giago's commentary drew both strong support and criticism.36
30. For example, the Dartmouth Review is campaigning to bring back the team's Indian name.
See Franz Lindz, Not A Very Sporting Symbol: Indians Have Ceased to be Appropriate Team
Mascots, SPORTS ILL, Sept. 17, 1990, at 8. While students may protest name changes, a school's
decision to change its team name does not intrude on its students' First Amendment rights. See
Crosby by Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding a high school principal's
decision to ban the schools' "Johnny Reb" symbol "based on complaints that it offended black
students and [at the] suggestion [of] the school's Minority Achievement Task Force" because
school officials may "disassociate [their] school from controversial speech even if [the decision]
may limit student expression").
31. The Lakota Times is published in Rapid City, South Dakota.
32. See, e.g., Tim Giago, Pigskin Mascots: A Seasonal Insult, LAKOTA TIMES, Sept. 25,
1991, at B5 ("The two teams most notorious for exploiting the skin color of Native Americans
are the Washington Redskins and the St. John's Redmen.'); Tim Giago, Talk Radio: Ignorance
Adds Insult to Injury, LAKOTA TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991, at B6 ('A common question was, 'Why are
Indians jumping on this issue all of the sudden when they haven't said anything all of these
years?' The fact of the matter is, we have been saying something all of these years but no one
was listening, and what is more, we never had a national forum from which to air our
grievances."); Tim Giago, In 1992, Let's Send Mascots Sailing Over the Ocean Blue, LAKOTA
TaMEs, Dec. 30, 1991, at B5 ("We now believe it is time for all elected tribal leaders to stand up
and help us bring this disgusting and disgraceful practice to an end.").
33. Tim Giago, I Hope the Redskins Lose, NEwswEEK, Jan. 27, 1991, at 8.
34. Id.
35. Id. George Shankle, a "nickname" historian, notes that "the American Indians were
nicknamed The Red-Skins by those persons who settled in the western part of the United States,
because the skin of the Indian is a reddish copper color." GEORGE EARLIE SHANKLE, AMERICAN
NICKNAMES: THEIR ORIGIN AND SIGNMICANCE 373 (1937).
36. Sen. Paul Simon of Illinois found the commentary an "excellent article." See Sen. Paul
Simon, Article 'Excellent,' LAKOTA TIMES, Feb. 12, 1992, at B4. Robert C. Hunter, President of
PepsiCo. Food Systems in Dallas, Texas wrote: "Continue to educate the ignorant from your
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Several Native American groups also have protested Native American
team names. One group, Native American Students for Progress, protested
several Redskins' regular season games.3" Another group, the National
Congress of American Indians, addressed offensive team names at their
Annual Convention in San Francisco, California. 8  The Congress of
American Indians issued a resolution which created a new office to, inter
alia, identify and challenge racial stereotypes.39 A third group, Concerned
American Indian Parents, created an enlightening poster which depicts four
pennants hanging on a wall.40 The first pennant reads, "Pittsburgh
perspective. There are many Americans that still do not realize how demeaning and degrading
these names can be... just because they've been a part of our past certainly does not make it
right. Every person has a right to be treated with dignity." Robert C. Hunter, Continue to
Educate the Ignorant, LAKOTA TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1992, at B4. Lorett Rueth of New Haven,
Kentucky wrote: "To many, taking offense at team names and mascot's names may seem like
'nit-picking.' However, as you eloquently pointed out, the use of these names is clearly indicative
of crass insensitivity." Lorett Rueth, Still Learning About Prejudice, LAKOTA TIMEs, Feb. 12,
1992, at B5.
Other letters were not so flattering. John Parker of Weatherford, Texas wrote, "U No Like-
urn Washington Redskins? Your 'My Turn' in Newsweek sounded wimpy and juvenile." John
Parker, Who Cares if They are Called the Washington Redskins?, LAKOTA TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1992,
at B5. Miriam H. Hemphill of Columbia, Missouri wrote: "I am sorry you feel that having a
team named the Redskins is demeaning to Indians. To me it seems complimentary.... I
honestly don't think anyone means to insult Indians by naming a team for them." Miriam H.
Hemphill, Please Take No Offense, LAKOTA TIMES, Feb. 12, 1992, at B4. Merle E. Lofgren
added: 'Tim [Giago] must talk to different Indians than I do. I found none on the Standing Rock
Reservation who agree with him. Maybe I talk to different Indians. I talk to ones on the street
and sometimes in cafes and bars and even outside my church. He probably talks to ones in
college think tanks and in protest groups." Merle E. Lofgren, Many Indians Do Not Agree,
LAKOTA TIME, Feb. 12, 1992, at B5.
37. Leonard Shapiro, Indian Group to Protest at Sunday's Game, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1991,
at B3.
38. The National Congress of American Indians was established in 1944. It is the oldest
national organization which represents Native American concerns. The Congress' goal is to
"promote the common interests and welfare of [the] American Indian and Alaskan Native
peoples." These interests include "speak[ing] out against racism and promot[ing] a greater
understanding [of the indigenous peoples of North America]." Resolution for National Congress
of American Indians to Take Action on Anti-Defamation, 48TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
AMERICAN INDIANs (1991).
39. Id.
40. The poster was created with the help of Martin-Williams Advertising, Inc., a Minneapolis,
Minnesota advertising agency and is distributed by the Minnesota-Dakotas office of the National
Conference of Christians and Jews.
Phil St. John, a Sioux, founded Concerned American Indian Parents after taking his two
sons to a Minneapolis secondary school basketball game. One of the teams playing was named
the "Indians." During the game, the team's mascot engaged in stereotypical portrayals of Native
Americans. This incident led St. John to found the organization and work to eliminate Native
1992]
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Negroes;" the second "Kansas City Jews;" the third "San Diego Cauca-
sians;" and the fourth "Cleveland Indians." The caption at the bottom of
the poster reads, "Maybe Now You Know How Native Americans Feel."
Native American groups also protested at the 1991 Major League
Baseball World Series games in Minneapolis, Minnesota and Atlanta,
Georgia. In Minneapolis, efforts led by the American Indian Movement
("AIM") attracted as many as 1,000 participants.41 At the conclusion of
the World Series, AIM officials met with Atlanta Braves management to
persuade them to change their team name.42 At a subsequent joint press
conference, Braves management did not rule out changing the name, but
stated there were no present plans to make such a change.43
The pinnacle of the protest efforts came when the Washington
Redskins qualified for Super Bowl XXVI. 4  Protesters seized this
opportunity to gain national media coverage for their cause. Between 2,000
and 3,000 people, including members of AIM, the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, the Urban Coalition, and the National
Organization for Women, protested use of the name Redskins outside Super
American team names in Minneapolis public schools. See Craig Neff, A Sign of Change, SPORTS
ILL., Feb. 1. 1988, at 10. His efforts were successful. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
Concerned American Indian Parents also successfully convinced CBS to drop references
to Indians as "savages" in the CBS special "This is America, Charlie Brown!" See Tony
Kennedy, Savage Editing Peanuts Show Revised After Indian Objections, LANSING STATE J., Oct.
13, 1988, at C7.
41. Leonard Shapiro, Protestors Want Super Bowl Platform: Native American Group Dislikes
Name, But Hopes Redskins in Game, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1991, at E6. The American Indian
Movement (AIM) was founded in 1968 and is headquartered in Minneapolis. Clyde and Vernon
Bellecourt, father and son respectively, direct the efforts of AIM.
42. See Cawthorn, supra note 16, at H8.
43. Id.
44. While this event was the high-water mark of protest efforts, protests over Native American
team names are not unique to 1991 and 1992. Just prior to the kickoff of the 1988 Super Bowl,
Fans Against Indian Racism (FAIR) flew a protest banner over Jack Murphy Stadium, located in
San Diego, California, where the Redskins played in Super Bowl XXIL Tom Friend, Onlookers
Keep Moving at Practice, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1988, at DS. FAIR also offered to sponsor a
contest to change the Redskins' name. MICHIGAN COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 5. Also in
1988, there were efforts in Indiana to change Native American team names. See, e.g., Lawrence
Hayes, Indian Names Must Go, J.-GAZMTTE, May 1, 1988, at C6 (Fort Wayne, Indiana); Lawrence
Hayes, More About Indians, J.-GAZrTE, May 27, 1988, at A8. In the early 1970's, there were
student protests at Dartmouth and Stanford University concerning the schools' Native American
team names. See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text. In 1971, Native American students
at Marquette were able to persuade school officials to abolish the school's Native American
mascot "Willie Wampum." See MICiGAN COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 4.
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Bowl XXVI in Minneapolis, Minnesota.s Protesters held banners and
shouted slogans as they marched around the stadium and denounced the use
of Native American team names and mascots."6
These protests have fallen on deaf ears. Two days prior to Super Bowl
XXVI, in his state-of-the-National Football League speech, NFL Commis-
sioner Paul Tagliabue discussed complaints concerning the names Redskins
and Chiefs.47 Tagliabue stated the NFL is "sensitive" to Native America-
ns' concerns about the team names, but added the names are not "demean-
ing.
48
Although protest efforts have had no effect in changing professional
team names and only some effect in changing college names, these efforts
have influenced other levels of organized athletics. In the Minneapolis
area, Concerned American Indian Parents convinced several local public
schools to change their Native American team names, and persuaded the
school board to adopt a policy encouraging the abandonment of racially
stereotypical team names.49
In addition to Native Americans, others have voiced their disapproval
of Native American team names. Notably, government agencies, legisla-
tors, and the media have begun to address the offensive nature of Native
American team names. In 1988, the Michigan State Civil Rights Commis-
sion ("Commission") prepared a detailed report on Native American team
names used in the state.50 The Commission found Native Americans are
the only racial group used as a team mascot or name in Michigan."' The
Commission, referring to team names, logos, and mascots, concluded that
"[the] use of Indian images is stereotypic[al], racist and discriminatory,"
and recommended "the use of Indian names, logos and mascots . . . be
discontinued [by Michigan schools] because racial stereotyping of Native
Americans is prevalent and destructive."' 2 Acting on the Commission's
recommendation, Eastern Michigan University dropped its Native American
45. Compare Ken Denlinger, Protest of "Redskins" Draws ZOOO at Stadium, WASH. POST.,
Jan. 27, 1992, at CIS (claiming the number was 2,000) with Eric Haase, 3,000 Rally Against
Racist Mascots, LAKOTA TIMES, Jan. 28, 1992, at Bi (claiming the number was nearly 3,000).
46. Denlinger, supra note 45, at CIS.
47. See Mike Freeman, NFL Deadline For Plan B Slips to Mar. 1. NFPLA Says Move Is
Political, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1992, at D7.
48. lit
49. See Dan Fields, Notes On A Scorecard, SPORTS ILL., Feb. 1, 1988, at 10.
50. See supra note 13.
51. MICMHGAN COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 14. Four of 52 colleges, 62 of 711 high
schools, and 33 of 605 junior high/middle schools had Native American team names or logos.
uiL at 23.
52. Id. at 26, 29.
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team name.53
Legislators are also beginning to act. In Missouri, proposed, but
ultimately unsuccessful, legislation would have prohibited fundingM to the
stadium where the Kansas City Chiefs play if the team were to "discrimi-
nate against Native Americans or mock sacred Native American sym-
bols."'5 In Washington, D.C., a resolution has been passed by the District
of Columbia Council which urges Washington Redskins owner Jack Kent
Cooke "to change [the team's name] to a name that is not offensive to
Native Americans or any other minority group."56
One major newspaper, the Oregonian,7 has courageously discontin-
ued printing any racial, religious, or ethnic team names which may be
considered offensive." This decision, like Giago's commentary in
Newsweek,59 prompted a flood of letters to the editor.' While no other
53. In 1991, the team changed its name from the Hurons. The school's president William
Shelton stated: "[We] never intended disrespect ... toward Native Americans." Michael Jaffe,
For The Record, SPORTS I.L, Feb. 11, 1991, at 208.
54. Current legislation provides for up to two million dollars to be allocated to the sports
complex where the Kansas City Chiefs play their home games. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 67.641
(Supp. 1991).
55. H.R. 1560, 86th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (1992) would have repealed Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 67.641 (Supp. 1991) and added new language. The bill was tabled in committee.
56. See Council of the District of Columbia Request for a Name Change of the National
Football League (NFL) Washington, D.C. Team, PR-330 (1992). Although the resolution was
unanimously passed, it does not have a binding legal effect on the Redskins organization. See
Rene Sanchez, Tougher Bail Law Activated In D.C.: Council Puts Vote Measure Into Effects
Now, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1992, at D5.
57. The Oregonian is a daily newspaper published in Portland, Oregon.
58. See William A. Hilliard, To Our Readers, OREGONIAN, Feb. 16, 1992, at D1 ('I have
directed this .action with the belief that these names tend to perpetuate stereotypes that damage
the dignity and self-respect of many people in our society and that this harm far transcends any
innocent entertainment or promotional value these names may have."). The Oregonian's decision
curbs the temptation to use catchy headlines in reporting teams with Native American names. For
example, a sports section headline in the Indianapolis Star read: "Mitchell, Redskins scalp
Vikings 24-7." INDtANAPoLs STAR, Jan. 3, 1993, at B1.
59. See supra note 33.
60. Some were extremely supportive and others were highly critical. Compare Ross Daily,
As Well as Overdue, Sensitive, Moral, OREGONLAN, Feb. 23, 1992, at F2 ("It's an overdue move,
and one which should be followed immediately by all media."); Phillip Park, Names Impact On
People, OREGONIAN, Feb. 23, 1992, at F2 ("Rather than being criticized, The Oregonian is to be
congratulated for its courageous stance in changing its editorial policy."); Rosemary Domkus,
Decision Reflects Understanding, OREGONIAN, Feb. 23 1992, at F2 ("Anyone who canceled his
or her newspaper subscription in protest of your new policy would benefit from a refresher course
in humanity.') with Randy Steck, Well-Intentioned But Ill.Conceived, OREGONIAN, Feb. 23, 1992,
at F2 ("You have overstepped your bounds. I urge you to re-consider this decision and opt for
accurate reporting of the facts."); Dick Hoskins, Names Reflect Winners, OREGONIAN, Feb. 23,
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major newspaper has followed the Oregonian's example,61 radio station
WTOP in Washington, D.C. stopped using the names "Redskins," "Braves"
and "Fighting Irish" for a brief period.'
However, not everyone agrees that Native American team names are
disrespectful to Native Americans.63 In response to media coverage of the
issue, letters sent to the editors of several newspapers have supported the
team names.(' In addition, a national public opinion poll by the Washing-
ton Post found eighty-nine percent of their sample believe the name
"Redskins" is not intended to be offensive and should not be changed.'
In fact, even some Native Americans do not support the protests.66 For
1992, at F2 ("[T]he names of sports teams (are] intend[ed] to reflect winners... [therefore they]
contribute to, rather than damage, the self-respect of those peoples."); John Kindseth Lodi, Animal
Nicknames Next to Go?, OREGONIAN, Feb. 23, 1992, at F2 ("P]olicy is shortsided, silly, panders
to politically correct whiners and an affront to academicians everywhere.").
61. The Sporting News, though, may also change its publication policy. Telephone interview
with John Rawlings, Sports Editor of The Sporting News (April 15, 1992).
62. See Leonard Shapiro, WTOP Won't Say 'Redskins': Radio Station Heeds Native
Americans' Distaste, WASH. PosT, March 15, 1992, at DI ("It's the minority group that
determines what's offensive, regardless of what the majority wants."). The station, however, had
second thoughts about its decision, and eventually a new station owner reversed the policy. See
Leonard Shapiro, SPORTS WAVES--Ban on 'Redskins' Still News at WTOP, WASH. POST, Apr.
3, 1992, at F2. See also Jeffery Yorke, On the Dial-Skins, Namely, Back at WTOP, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 10, 1992, at C7.
63. In an uncharacteristic statement, given his past human rights contributions, Former
President Jimmy Carter declared: "With the Braves on top, we have a brave, courageous and
successful team, and I think we can look on the American Indian as brave, successful and
attractive. So I don't look on [the name Braves] as an insult." Charles Walston, WORLD SERIES
'91 Miller, Carter Disagree with Indian Protesters. ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 24, 1991, at D7.
64. Concerning the selection of team names, one individual noted that "Native Americans
should be proud that they were deemed worthy of such recognition." Charles W. Herdman,
Braves & Tomahawks, SPORTs ILL., Nov. 25, 1991, at 6. See also Joe Welch, Name Game,
SPORTING Nuws, Dec. 30, 1991, at 6 (editorial letter praising Ted Turner for retaining the name
"Braves" rather than bowing to pressure applied by special interest groups).
65. See Richard Morin, "America's Team" Has a New Home: Washington, WASH. POST, Jan.
17, 1992, at Gl.
66. See Mike Brosenne, Native American Protests-Overdone, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1991, at
A20 (letter to the editor by member of the Eastern Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma encouraging
Native Americans to end trivial protests and focus their energy on more constructive solutions to
Native American problems). See also Terence Moore, Tomahawk Chop Getting Old Anyway,
ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 23, 1991, at D2 (In a letter to Florida State Officials, Chief James E.
Billie of the Florida Seminole Tribe wrote: "I've often thought that a lot of people would like
to be considered an Indian or a Native American. If they are not by birth, then they choose to
use an American tribe as a namesake that is indicative of their toughness.").
Giago, who had been a long time critic of AIM, stated: "We are allowed to have our
differences, but on an issue of national importance, we as Indian people, no matter what tribe
we're from, we must unite." Haase, supra note 45, at B2.
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example, the Chief of the Cherokee tribe in North Carolina finds nothing
wrong with the names 'Redskins" or "Braves."'"
Despite the disagreement as to the propriety of the team names, there
is growing dissatisfaction among Native Americans and many others. The
obvious choice for athletic teams interested in countering this growing
dissatisfaction, would be to voluntarily change their offensive names.
Obstinately, the Braves," Chiefs, Indians, and Redskins'9 appear deter-
mined to retain their current Native American names.
IV. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF TEAM TRADEMARKS
Professional teams register their names, and often several logos, as
trademarks. These trademarks are an important source of team and
league revenues. The merchandising of team trademarks on clothing,
athletic equipment, and novelty gifts produces considerable revenues each
year." In 1990, analysts estimated professional athletic licensing pro-
67. See Leonard Shapiro, Offensive Penalty is Called on "Redskins": Native Americans
Protest the Name, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1991, at D1; World Series '91 Cherokee Tribe Supports
Chop, May Adopt Braves, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 24, 1991, at D7. The Chief, however, may be
biased. The Cherokee tribe in North Carolina manufactures most of the foam tomahawks used
in Atlanta and provides Native American souvenirs sold at RFK stadium where the Redskins play
theirhomegames. These operations provide approximately 300 jobs to members of the Cherokee
tribe. I-
Asked about Native Americans who are fans of the Redskins, Clyde Belecourt, executive
director of AIM stated: "You'll always find scouts willing to ride with the cavalry." Rachel
Shuster, Indian Group Targets Redskins Name Next, USA TODAY, Jan. 17, 1992, at Cl. See also
THoMAs W. DUNLAY, INDLAN ScouTs AND Auxiums WrH T m U.S. ARMY IN TIm TRANs-
Mississippi WEST, 1860-1890 (1950).
68. Ted Turner, owner of the Atlanta Braves believes: "There is nothing wrong with [the
name] Braves. It's a compliment. Braves are warriors .... No, I don't plan on changing the
name." Dan Burkhart, Turner Won't Change Braves' Name, But Wouldn't Mind Stopping the
Chop, ATLANTA J., Dec. 3, 1991, at F8.
69. After winning Super Bowl XXVI, Redskins owner Jack Kent Cooke stated that "[t]here
is nothing in the world wrong with the name Redskins." Denlinger, supra note 45, at C18.
70. The Braves, Chiefs, Indians, and Redskins hold numerous trademarks that are registered
world wide. Whether team names are registered as "service marks" or "trademarks," they are
entitled to identical protection and must meet the same registration requirements. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1053 (1988) ("Subject to the provisions relating to the registration of trade-marks ... service
marks shall be registrable, in the same manner and with the same effect as are trade-marks, and
when registered they shall be entitled to the [same] protection provided herein in the case of
trade-marks.").
71. See generally Glenn M. Wong, Recent Trademark Law Cases Involving Professional and
Intercollegiate Sports, I DET. C.L. REV. 87 (1986); David M. Kelly, Comment, Trademarks:
Protection of Merchandising Properties in Professional Sports, 21 DUQ. L. REv. 927 (1983).
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duced over $3.8 billion in sales.72 This figure is more than $2.4 billion
greater than the revenues produced in 1985."3
Collegiate licensing is also lucrative. This appears to be the result of
network telecasts of collegiate events, begun in the 1970's. In 1989, the
University of Notre Dame led the nation in collegiate trademark licensing
revenue, earning one million dollars. 4 The sixth largest licensing revenue
belonged to the University of Iowa at a respectable half million dollars.75
In 1989, total collegiate licensing reached one billion dollars, twice that of
1986.76
Professional team trademarks are licensed on a variety of items
including such traditional ones as jackets, baseball hats, and t-shirts, as well
as such obscure items as bird feeders, underwear, and hubcaps." College
trademarks also appear on a variety of items ranging from golf visors to
vanity license plates.78 One can even purchase toilet paper with Chief
Iliniwek's picture imprinted on the sheets.79
Professional leagues have been so successful in merchandising their
teams' trademarks that several have established exclusive licensing agents.
In 1963, NFL Properties was created to license the trademarks of what are
now twenty-eight teams.' In addition, Major League Baseball Properties,
NBA Properties, and the Licensing Company of America (for the National
Hockey League), have been created to license their respective league's team
trademarks.
The Washington Redskins have been very effective in licensing their
team trademarks. The Redskins ranked sixth in NFL licensing in 1987 and
second in 1988. In addition, because the Redskins have played in
several recent Super Bowls, they have enjoyed a boost in sales the years
72. See Chuck Stogel, Teams Logos Turning Into Gold, SPORTING NEWS. Nov. 12, 1990, at
48.
73. Id.




77. See Stogel, supra note 72, at 48.
78. Gerald Eskenazi, Sports Logos Now Symbols of Big Profits, N.Y. TMEs, June 19, 1989,
at Al.
79. See Haase, supra note 45, at BI.
80. See Elizabeth Comte, NFL Properties' Values Booming, SPORTING NEws, Oct. 30, 1989,
at 64.
81. Richard Rosenblatt, Bears Are NFLS Best Sellers, SPORTING NEWS, May 22, 1989, at 49
(1987 revenue was 32.5 million dollars and 1988 revenue was 50.6 million dollars).
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following their victories.8 Individual successes such as this are mislead-





The Lanham Act currently governs federal trademark law." The act
defines a trademark as any "word, name, symbol or device" used by a
manufacturer or merchant to identify its goods and distinguish them from
those of another manufacturer or merchant.8 5 While the Lanham Act is
a comprehensive statute, it leaves undisturbed the principles of common law
trademark. Common law protection arises when the mark is first used in
connection with the sale of the good or service." Accordingly, a trade-
mark owner has common law rights in addition to rights under the Lanham
Act
B. The Federal Registration Process
The Lanham Act provides for the federal registration of marks" on
two Registers: the Principal 8 and the Supplemental.89 Marks eligible
82. Id.
83. This income sharing arrangement tends to belie the economic harm argument used to
support preservation of Native American team names. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
84. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). The Act is named after Representative Fritz G.
Lanham who introduced the bill. The Lanham Act replaced the Trademark Act of 1905. For a
comparison of the two Acts, see DAPHNE ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL (1947).
Two helpful examinations of the Lanham Act are Bartholomew Diggins, The Lanham Trade-Mark
Act, 35 GEo. U. 147 (1947) and Elwin A. Andrus & Merle E. Sceales, The New Trade-Mark
Act, 1947 Wis. L. REV. 618 (1947).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
86. See infra notes 258-263 and accompanying text.
87. A mark is defined as "any trade-mark, service mark, collective mark, or certification
mark' that is entitled to registration under the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72.
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1091-96. The Supplemental Register enables the owner of a mark to
register it domestically as a basis for foreign protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1091. In addition, when
the mark does not qualify for registration on the Principal Register but has acquired secondary
meaning, it may be registered on the Supplemental Register. Id. After this footnote, any
reference to "federal registration" refers exclusively to registration of the Principal Register.
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for registration on the Principal Register are trademarks, 9° service
marks,9' collective marks,92 and certification marks." A trademark may
be granted registration subject not only to the specific requirements of these
two Registers but also the Lanham Act as a whole.
To obtain registration on the Principal Register, the trademark
applicant is required to complete an application form and tender a fee to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office." Once this is done, the
trademark examiner makes an "ex parte" determination of whether the
trademark is subject to federal protection.95
Two threshold requirements that must be met are whether the
trademark has been "used in commerce,"" and whether the mark has been
affixed to the goods sold or transported in commerce.97 Additionally, and
most importantly for this Article's discussion, the examiner must decide
whether the trademark violates 15 U.S.C. § 1052.98 This section pre-
scribes prohibitions to federal registration:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registra-
tion on the principal register on account of its nature unless it-
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandal-
ous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a
connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.99
If a trademark is "found not entitled to registration," an applicant can
submit an amended application within six months." Upon a final denial
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1053 (service marks are afforded the same protection given to trademarks).
A "service mark" is a mark used in the sale or advertising of services. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1054, 1127.
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1054, 1127.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1113. False or fraudulent statements contained in the application subject the
applicant to civil penalties. 15 U.S.C. § 1120.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1062.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1051. The phrase "used in commerce" refers to use in United States
interstate commerce or in United States commerce with foreign countries. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
99. Id. In contrast to the Lanham Act, the Copyright Act does not deny copyright registration
to works of authorship which may be deemed immoral or obscene. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
See also Mitchell Brothers Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theatres, 604 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) ("1909 copyright statute [contains] no explicit or implicit
bar to the copyrighting of obscene materials and [provides] for the copyright ol all creative
works.").
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1062(b).
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of registration, the applicant may appeal the examiner's decision.'0 1 If
the examiner determines the mark is entitled to registration, the mark will
be published in the Official Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice."°2 Within thirty days following the mark's first publication, "any
person who believes that he would be damaged by the registration of [the]
mark... may file an opposition.""1 3
If an opposition is filed, an opposition proceeding is initiated. An
opposition proceeding is an adversarial hearing before the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board ('Trademark Board").104 To prevail, the opposer must
plead and prove standing, 5 and state why the mark in question should
not be granted registration.'06 Equitable defenses are available to the
owner of the trademark."
A decision by the Trademark Board may be appealed to either the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit' or to one of the United States
District Courts.' 9 If opposition to the trademark fails, a certificate of
registration is issued."0 A certificate of registration remains in effect for
ten years"' and can be renewed for subsequent ten year periods."2
Once the Patent and Trademark Office grants a trademark federal
registration, its owner is entitled to several rights and protections."'
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1070.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1063.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1067. The proceeding must "be heard by at least three members of the
[Trademark] Board." Id.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1063.
106. For example, this may mean the applicant has failed to use the mark "in commerce."
See Community of Roquefort v. Santo, 443 F.2d 1196 (C.C.P.A. 1971); Lipton Indus., Inc. v.
Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982). It may also mean that registration is
prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1052. See Bromberg v. Carmel Self Serv., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
176 (1978).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1069 (e.g., laches, estoppel, and acquiescence).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1988). Once a final decision is reached by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the case may be appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1256 (1988). Whether to pursue an action in district court
or with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is up to the appealing party.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b); 15 U.S.C. § 1121. Once a final decision is reached by the district
court, the case may be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988);
15 U.S.C. § 1121, and then to the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(b).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (subject to filing an affidavit of use by the trademark's owner that
the trademark is still used in commerce or its lack of use meets one of the sections' exceptions).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1059.
113. See generally Note, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARV. L. REV. 814,827-31
(1955).
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First, a certificate of registration is "prima facie evidence of the validity of
the registration," and the registrant's ownership and exclusive right to use
the mark."" For purposes of enforcement, federal registration implies the
existence of a federal question. Thus, a party may have access to the
federal court system without meeting the amount in controversy or diversity
requirements."' In a civil infringement action, the registered owner of
a trademark may recover damages, defendant's profits, and costs of the
suit."6 Additionally, the registered owner may destroy any infringing
articles." In "exceptional cases," reasonable attorney fees may also be
awarded to the prevailing party." s
Further, a federally registered trademark is incontestable unless it is
subject to cancellation under 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) or (5).119 Federal
registration also provides "constructive notice of the registrant's claim"
thereby eliminating any possibility of a good faith defense by an infring-
er."° Lastly, federal registration affords the trademark owner rights and
remedies against imported goods infringing the trademark.'
C. Interpretation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(a)
When interpreting section 1052(a), it is important to remember the
drafters of the Lanham Act significantly expanded prohibitions on
trademark registrability. Under the 1905 Trademark Act, only marks which
"[c]onsist[ed] of or comprise[d] immoral or scandalous matter" were
prohibited,' whereas under the Lanham Act, such concepts as disparage-
ment, contempt, and ridicule have been added to the prohibited material.
The policy considerations behind the drafters' expansion of the prohibitions
should not be ignored when considering how to construe these bars to
registration. Had the drafters intended to broaden the scope of trademark
subject matter to encompass more questionable marks, they would not have
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b); 15 U.S.C. 1115(a). See also May Dep't. Stores Co. v. Schloss
Bros. & Co., 234 F.2d 879 (C.C.P.A. 1956); Iowa Farmers Union v. Farmers' Educ. & Co-op
Union, 247 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1957).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1121.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1117.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1118.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1117.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1065; 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b). Title 15, § 1064(3) is discussed at length infra
notes 218-50 and accompanying text.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1072.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1124.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 85(a) (1905).
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added several new prohibitions.
Neither the text nor the legislative history of the Lanham Act defines
the prohibitions found in section 1052(a). Accordingly, to construe the
language of section 1052(a), one must consider federal court and Trademark
Board decisions interpreting the Lanham Act, as well as dictionary
definitions. In addition, most states have enacted trademark statutes which
are similar if not identical to the Lanham Act.'73 Despite federal and
state legislation, there is a "dearth" of case law interpreting prohibited mat-
ter.lU
1. Cases Decided Under the 1905 Act
In 1938 Ex parte Martha Maid Manufacturing'2 was the first case
to interpret the language of the 1905 Act. The case involved a denial of
registration because the mark was prohibited by section 5(a).' 6  The
mark in question, "Queen Mary," was used in connection with "women's
undergarments, including slips, dance sets, etc.'""V The examiner refused
registration because the mark was scandalous.s In a brief opinion, the
Commissioner of Patents ("Commissioner") affirmed the refusal.
29
A few months later, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("Court
of Customs") decided In re Riverbank Canning Co."30 The applicant
appealed the examiner's refusal to register "MADONNA" as a mark for
wines on the grounds it was scandalous within the meaning of section 5(a)
of the 1905 Act. 31  The Commissioner affirmed, 32 and an appeal was
granted by the Court of Customs.
133
The Court of Customs held scandalous must be given "its ordinary and
123. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-441 (1991).
124. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (specifically referring to
interpretations of "immoral").
125. 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156 (1938).
126. Section 5 was the 1905 Act's version of 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
127. 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 156.
128. Id
129. Id.
130. 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938). This decision attracted limited scholarly comment See
Austin Dunn, Note, Trademarks and Tradenames-Scandalous Matter, 18 OR. L. REv. 58 (1938).
Although Dunn incorrectly states Riverbank Canning was the first case in this area, certainly this
decision is a much more insightful examination of section 5(a) than is Martha Maid.
131. 95 F.2d at 327.
132. 30 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 374 (1936).
133. 95 F.2d at 327.
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common meaning."''" This meaning was defined as:
1. Causing or tending to cause scandal; ... shocking to
the sense of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful; offensive;
disreputable; ....
2. Giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings;
exciting reprobation; calling out condemnation; .... 135
Applying this guideline, the Court of Customs found "MADONNA" was
not "per se scandalous."' 36 However, "consideration ordinarily must be
given to the goods upon which the mark is used."' 37  Applying this
criteria, the Court of Customs upheld the refusal to register.'38
134. Id. at 328.
135. Id. (citations omitted).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 95 F.2d at 327 (Mark's "use upon wine for beverage purposes would be shocking to the
sense of propriety of nearly all who do not use wine as a beverage, and also to many who do so
use it.").
However, there was a dissent, Id. at 329-31 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The logic of the
dissent, though, is far from infallible. First, Judge Jackson argued: "If the use of the trade mark
'Madonna,' as applied to the goods and articles mentioned, gave offense or scandal, it seems to
me it would be noised about and probably these articles would have but scanty sale." Id. at 330.
Tying societal opinions to sales is a fallacious argument. For example, many people believe
pornography is offensive, yet its sales are brisk. The people who purchase pornography cannot
reasonably be understood to speak for those who oppose pornography.
Second, the dissent argued the mark was registered on other items, including food. Id.
Therefore, used in connection with food, the mark was just as scandalous as when used in
connection with alcohol. The dissent stated: "The excessive use of good food results in evil.
Surely a glutton gives scandal comparable to the scandal caused by one who drinks alcoholic
beverages to excess." Id. The majority opinion had dismissed the relevance of these prior
registrations: "Whether such registrations were properly issued is not before us, and their issuance
constitutes no reason why the registration of appellant's mark here involved should be allowed
if it is in fact scandalous." Id. at 328. Further, comparing a gourmand to an alcoholic, at best,
lacks any rational explanation. Aside from the fact both glorify excess, not only are the
characteristics and causes of each unique, but society views the two quite differently.
After the Riverbank Canning decision, the Trademark Board heard its share of cases dealing
with religious trademarks. See Ex parte Summit Brass and Bronze Works, Inc., 59 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 22 (1943) (pictorial representation of the Agnus Dei, an image or representation of a lamb
as an emblem of Christ, used in connection with tabernacle safes was held "offensive to most
individuals of the Christian faith") (citing In re Riverbank Canning, 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938));
In re Sociedade Agricola E. Comerical Dos Vinhos Messias, S.A.R.L., 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275
(1968) (use of the word "Messias" in connection with wine and brandy was considered
scandalous).
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2. Cases Decided Under the Lanham Act
The first case interpreting section 1052(a) was decided in 1951.
Doughboy Industries, Inc. v. Reese Chemical Co., 39 involved the mark
"Dough-boy" used in connection with prophylactics." The appeal
concerned the examiner's dismissal of an opposition to the mark 41
While the Trademark Board reversed the examiner's dismissal, it also made
an ex parte review of the appropriateness of the subject matter of the
mark.1
42
The Trademark Board determined the mark was a name "given to the
American soldier in the first World War."' 43  Therefore, when used in
connection with prophylactics, the mark violated section 1052(a).'" In
its opinion, the Trademark Board noted the prohibitions in the 1905 Act
were narrower than those of the 1946 Act, 45 but stated that an interpreta-
tion of the new Act's provisions, including the newly added prohibitions,
should be identical to one under the 1905 Act.' 46 The Trademark Board
stated that the analysis under the 1905 Act was established in Riverbank
Canning. 
47
A decision interpreting the meaning of "immoral" came in 1952. In
Ex parte Parfum L'Orle, Inc.,"4 registration was refused by the examiner
on the ground "Libido," used in connection with perfumes, "refers to sexual
desire."'49  While the Patent Office Examiner in Chief, ("Examiner in
Chief'), noted there were prior cases cited by the examiner and applicant
which interpreted section 1052(a), he stated those cases dealt with different
problems than those at issue.'" The Examiner in Chief observed that the
139. 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 227 (1951).
140. id.
141. Id
142. Id. at 227-28.
143. Ia at 228.
144. 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 228 (A mark which "[c]onsists of or comprises ... matter which
may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs,
or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute" is unregistrable.).
145. 1d. (the 1905 Act "merely barred ... immoral or scandalous matter").
146. Id.
147. I.
148. 93 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (1952).
149. Id.
150. Id. The Examiner in Chief found Exparte Martha Maid Mfg. Co., 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
156 (1938), involved "the name of a famous personage"; In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d
327 (C.C.P.A. 1938), and Ex parte Summit Brass & Bronze Works, 59 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 22
(1943), involved "names and words of religious significance"; and Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. The
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case "appears to be the first instance in which the question of refusal of a
registration on the ground of the immoral or scandalous nature of the mark
itself' had been decided.'51 The Examiner in Chief determined the mark
"has more general meanings than the particular one mentioned... and is
probably not a word in every day use.' 152 Relying on an English deci-
sion, 53 she held section 1052(a) did not prohibit the mark from being
registered.1
4
On July 24, 1959, the Trademark Board issued two opinions interpret-
ing section 1052(a). One of theses cases 5' addressed the appeal of a
refusal to register the word "Senussi" as the name of a cigarette in In re
Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken."' The "Senussi" trademark held a valid
German registration issued in 1919."s  Evidence presented before the
Trademark Board showed the word "Senussi" referred to a sect of Muslims
which forbade the use of cigarettes. 5
Because the trademark was the name of a religious order or sect whose
followers were not allowed to use the product, the Trademark Board
determined the "Senussi" trademark was an "affront to such persons and
tend[ed] to disparage their beliefs."'59 The Trademark Board held that
use of the sect's name on cigarettes would be "scandalous" and therefore
Reese Chem. Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 227 (1951), involved "the name of a group of persons the
use of which on the particular goods involved was considered disparaging."
151. 93 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (1952).
152. Id. at 482.
153. Ird at 481 n.1. See In re La Marquise Footwear's Application, 64 R.P.D. & T.M. 27
(1946) ("[Mn American slang this strange word 'Oomph' has a significance, I think, of sex appeal,
I do not think that, if all the circumstances of this case are taken into account, including the circle
of people in which such words are likely to be current, it is just to reject on that ground an
application for registration.").
154. The Examiner in Chief similarly stated: "I do not think that, when used in ordinary
writing or speech, particularly among the class of persons who would be apt to use such a word,
it would be considered shocking, or offensive, or obscene, and I do not believe that the Office
can refuse registration in this particular case on the ground raised." IS at 482.
155. The second opinion was In re PJ. Valckenberg, GmbIL, 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334
(1959). In this decision, the Trademark Board dispelled any doubt that scandalous under the 1946
Act should not be interpreted differently than under the 1905 Act. The mark seeking registration
was 'MADONNA" which was used in connection with wine. Id Relying on In re Riverbank
Canning, the Trademark Board found the meaning of scandalous had not been changed in the
Lanham Act and affirmed the refusal of registration. Id at 334-35.
156. In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken, 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339 (1959).
157. See German Trademark Reg. No. 235,739 (dated Sept. 27, 1919).
158. While there may be a "dearth" of case law in this area, the Board's reliance on
secondary sources for definitions is widespread. Here, the Board relied on the Encyclopaedia
Britannica. 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 339.
159. I
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registration was properly refused."
Four years later, in In re Waughtel,1 61 the Trademark Board ad-
dressed a dispute concerning a trademark comprised of the Amish name
above a cameo dressed in Amish fashion.1 62 The examiner had denied
registration to the trademark finding it "scandalous" when used in
connection with cigars." 3  In making this determination, the examiner
relied on the standard announced in In re Reemtsma Cigaretten-
fabriken.
64
On appeal, the applicant argued it had presented affidavits which
conclusively supported registration. The affidavits were of two Amish men
who stated they were well versed in Amish ways, there were no Amish
teachings against the use of cigars, numerous members of the Amish sect
smoked cigars, and some even raised tobacco.' 61 No contrary evidence
was presented by the petitioner, and thus the Trademark Board concluded
the registration was improperly denied.1"
In 1975,167 the Trademark Board decided In re Thomas Laboratories,
Inc.' s This appeal involved a mark "for a corrective implement for
increasing the size of the human penis."'69 The applicant described its
mark as "a simple caricature of an unclothed man sitting and looking down
160. 1&
161. 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 594 (1963).
162. I& at 594-95.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 595 (quoting In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken, 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339, 339
(1959)).
165. i
166. 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 595.
167. Between 1963 and 1975, the Trademark Board decided three cases involving section
1052(a). See In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443,443 (1971) ("BUBBY TRAP" used for
brassieres held scandalous because it would be offensive to a "segment of the public sense of
propriety ...." The Trademark Board relied on a dictionary definition which defined "bubby
as Breast, now often considered vulgar."); In re Hepperle, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 512, 512 (1972)
(The mark "ACAPULCO GOLD" used in connection with suntan lotion was refused registration
on the grounds the mark was "a commonly understood term meaning marijuana." The Trademark
Board held "to the average purchaser of suntan lotion in the normal marketing milieu ...
'ACAPULCO GOLD' would suggest the resort city of Acapulco noted for its sunshine and other
climatic attributes rather than marijuana."); In re Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334, 335 (1973)
(Application to register "WEEK-END SEX" as the title of a magazine would admittedly "bring
to mind a magazine dealing with sexual relationships," but was not prohibited from registration
based on the "moral values and conduct fashionable at the moment, rather than that of past
decades.').
168. 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 50 (1975).
169. Id. at 51. The goods already held a valid United States registration under the designation
"LEGEND LENGTHENER." Registration No. 998,772, issued Nov. 19, 1974.
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in a side view."17 The Trademark Board, however, described the mark
as "a cartoon-like representation of a melancholy, unclothed male figure
ruefully contemplating an unseen portion of his genitalia."'' The
examiner refused registration in light of "the entire pose of the figure" and
because "the mark, in the marketplace, is not viewed in a vacuum, but is
viewed in connection with the goods."'2
The Trademark Board noted both the goods used in connection with
the mark and the "moral values and conduct which contemporary society
has deemed to be appropriate and acceptable" should be considered to
determine whether the mark was immoral or scandalous.'73 Relying on
an obscenity decision, the Trademark Board also noted the difficulty of
determining the "moral values and conduct [of] contemporary society."' 74
In reversing the examiner's refusal, the Trademark Board relied on the
above two criteria and a second obscenity case. 75 The Board held "the
mark as applied to the specific goods [here] involved to be innocuous in
character and, thereby, to involve no threat to present-day public morals or
sense of propriety."176
An athletic team whose trademark is challenged may attempt to rely
on the Trademark Board's 1975 decision, In re Condas S.A.'" In re
Condas S.A. was the appeal of a refusal to register the trademark "JAP"
because the examiner found the trademark "may disparage or falsely
suggest a connection with the Japanese."' 78  The Trademark Board
170. 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 51.
171. Id at 52 (graphic material reproduced).
172. Id. at 51.
173. Id at 52 (citing In re Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334 (1973)). The Trademark Board
noted nudity alone is not a ground to refuse registration, rather the "mien or posture" of the
subject of the mark "must necessarily involve an element of immorality or lewdness." Id. at 51.
In this instance, the Trademark Board broadened the definition of "immoral" to include
"lewdness."
174. The Trademark Board stated: "Probably the fundamental reason why the word obscene
is not susceptible of exact definition is that such intangible moral concepts as it purports to
connote, vary in meaning from one period to another." In re Thomas Lab., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
50, 52 (quoting Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1940)).
175. 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 52 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,487 n.20 (1957))
("A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e.,
a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters.").
176. Id. This language may also be read as another expansion of the scope of 15 U.S.C. §
1052(a). Previously the Trademark Board talked of "offending" the public morals. Here, the
Board is now talking about "threats" to these morals.
177. 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 544 (1975).
178. Id.
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reversed the refusal of registration,179 basing its decision on Japanese
American Citizens League v. Takada,n ° and the fact that a Japanese
individual owned the corporation seeking the registration, claiming it would
be absurd for him to disparage himself.' Registration was allowed
despite evidence the Japanese American Citizens League, public figures,
and newspapers "[had] been highly critical" of the proposed trademark.i s
A challenger could distinguish In re Condas S.A. on two grounds.
First, one could argue the Trademark Board relied on a proposition in
Takada which is no longer good law. Takada held that "injury to feelings"
did not constitute standing."a Since Takada was decided, the Trademark
Board has determined that standing may be established by "injury to feel-
ings.""' Second, the Trademark Board was persuaded by appellants'
argument that because Takada was Japanese, he would not use a trademark
which disparaged Japanese people.'8 This argument is preposterous.se
If accepted, it would mean an African American could trademark the word
"nigger"'I  or an Hispanic American could trademark "spick." Because
of the poor reasoning underlying In re Condas S.A., a challenger could
argue the case should carry no precedential value, otherwise, the policy
underlying the disparaging mark prohibition would be negated and the
statute's language would be superfluous.
The 1981 decision, In re McGinley,188 was the first appeal of a
Trademark Board decision involving section 1052(a) since In re Riverbank
Canning and provided three levels of administrative and judicial review of
the validity of the mark in question."8 9 The mark "comprise[d] a photo-
179. Id.
180. 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 109 (1971).
181. 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 544.
182. Id
183. 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 109 ("[P]etitioners have merely assumed the role of champions
of the community and are not the proper parties and have not shown any injury as a result of the
use of [JAP'].').
184. See infra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
185. 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 544.
186. Professor Richard Delgado stated that "[m]ost people today know that certain words are
offensive and only calculated to wound. No other use remains for such words as 'nigger,' 'wop,'
'spick,' or 'kike."' Richard Delgado, Words that Wound. A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 145 (1982) (footnote omitted).
187. Cf. Lee v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 4th 510, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (1992) (upholding
the denial of a request by an African American applicant to officially change his name to include
a form of racial epithet "nigger").
188. 660 F.2d 481 (Fed. Cir. 1981).
189. Id. The registrability of the mark was reviewed by the examiner, the Trademark Board,
and the Federal Circuit.
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graph of a nude man and woman kissing and embracing in a manner
appearing to expose the male genitalia" 9° and was used in connection
with a "'Newsletter Devoted to Social and Interpersonal Relationship
Topics' and 'Social Club Services."""' The examiner denied registration
to the mark" 2 and his decision was affirmed on appeal by the Trademark
Board.
19 3
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the appellant contested the denial on
several grounds, all of which failed. First, appellant claimed section
1052(a) was "constitutionally 'void for vagueness. '""94  The Federal
Circuit dismissed this argument and stated "'scandalous' is sufficiently
precise to satisfy due process requirements. '"
The appellant also contended the mark should be considered without
reference to the goods or services with which it was associated.191 The
court noted, in determining the nature of the mark, "the mark must be
considered in the context of the marketplace as applied to only the goods
or services described in the application for registration."" The court
added that "inquiry into the specific goods or services not shown in the
application" is irrelevant1 s Thus, the argument was rejected, but the
scope of the examination was not broadened.
Next, appellant argued the mark at issue was not immoral or scandal-
190. Id at 482.
191. Id The court further stated that "the newsletter has to do with discussions of sexual
topics such as bisexuality, homosexuality, masturbation, and fornication; that the services include
sponsoring and arranging parties for 'swinging,' which appears to be a form of group sex." Id
192. The examiner stated: "[Aippellant's services involve various 'mini-affairs' between two
unmarried people; sometimes two or more unmarried people .... 'Such activities are considered
deviations from the sexual norm of husband and wife relations. Such activities are immoral and
scandalous."' 660 F.2d 481,482 (Fed. Cir. 1981) (emphasis added by Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit).
193. The Trademark Board's decision is found at 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 753 (1979). The
Trademark Board identified a broad class of people who the newsletter "could appeal to, be
offered to, and be read [by]." Id The Trademark Board concluded, "[First,] the overwhelming
majority of the people who are potential readers of applicant's newsletter as described... would
be affronted by the use of (the] mark .... [Second,] by any standard, including the most
contemporaneous mores of what has been repeatedly described as a permissive, but not licentious,
society, applicant's photograph, when used as a mark for any goods or services, is offensive to
propriety and morality, outrages a sense of decency, and is shocking to the moral sense of
members of the community, whose sensibilities are protected by the statute." Id at 756.
194. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 483.
195. Id. at 485.
196. Id at 483-84.
197. Id at 485.
198. Id (applauding the Trademark Board's approach in In re Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. at 335).
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ous.'" The court stated: "Whether or not the mark, including innuendo,
is scandalous is to be ascertained from the standpoint of not necessarily a
majority, but a substantial composite of the general public."2m While the
dissent in McGinley questions the reasoning behind this standard, ° the
standard has been cited with approval by the Trademark Board.2'
The first of two cases decided in 1988 was In re Hershey. 3
Applicant appealed the examiner's refusal to register its mark "BIG
PECKER BRAND" imprinted on T-shirts.' The examiner refused
registration, deeming the mark scandalous because "'pecker' is a slang or
vulgar expression for 'penis"' and "'big' contribute[d] to the vulgarity of
the mark." 5
After restating the standards established in In re McGinley' and its
definition of scandalous, the Trademark Board reversed the refusal. 
21
First, the Trademark Board found the slang dictionary definitions the
examiner relied on were "relevant," but "did not carry great weight in
199. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 483.
200. Id. at 485 (citing In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d at 329 n.7) (Riverbank Canning
held the use of "MADONNA" on wine "would be shocking to the sense of propriety of nearly
all who do not use wine as a beverage, and also to many who do so use it.") (emphasis added).
The express application of the standard in McGinley is implicitly applicable to the other
prohibitions in 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). Section 1052(a) should be read as a whole, not as a string
of disjointed clauses. Therefore, the standard announced for one prohibition should be equally
applicable to another.
201. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 487 (Rich, ., dissenting with whom Baldwin, I., joined).
202. See In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 865 (1981) ("Bullshit" used on
"hand-bags, purses, belts, and wallets" gives "offense to the conscience [and] is shocking to the
sense of decency or propriety of a substantial composite of the general public of the United
States.").
203. 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470 (1988).
204. Id. The mark comprised the name "BIG PECKER BRAND" and a picture of a bird with
a large bill. I. at 1472 (graphic material reproduced).
205. Id. (The examiner relied on slang, conventional dictionary definitions, and articles
retrieved from the NEXIS research database.).
206. Id. The concurrence, though, does not use the "substantial composite" language found
in McGinley; rather, Boardmember Cissel uses a "significant number of potential purchasers" and
a "significant portion of the readers [of the Hershey opinion]" standard. In addition, Cissel
misinterprets the evidentiary value of brisk sales. Cissel states:
Applicant apparently enjoys a reasonable business in selling its goods under this
mark. If the double entendre were in fact objectionable, why is it that business has
developed to the point where the mark is worth the effort and expense of protecting
it with registration? If it were actually so offensive, people simply would not
purchase products bearing it.
Id at 1472. A mere fifty years after the Riverbank Canning decision, this argument seems even
less plausible. See supra note 135-39 and accompanying text.
207. 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
NATIVE AMERICAN TEAM NAMES
determining whether a substantial number of the general public even
recognize[ld] the term 'pecker' as a slang word for penis."2' As to
evidence retrieved from the NEX[S database,' the Trademark Board
stated, "this evidence, standing alone, is at best marginal to demonstrate
that the mark is a vulgar, slang reference to male genitalia and would be
recognized as such a reference by a substantial composite of the general
public. 210 In addition, the applicant was able to establish that the word
pecker has an "innocuous" primary meaning to the public, one of a bird's
bill.
21
In re In Over Our Heads Inc. is the most recent pronouncement on
section 1052(a)." At issue was a mark which was comprised of the
word "MOONTES" and a design incorporating the word in connection with
"dolls" which "drop their pants when a collapsible bulb is squeezed, thus
exposing their buttocks. 21'  The "00" portion of the 'MOONIES"
design appeared "in buttocks caricature."2 4  The mark was refused
registration on the ground "it comprise[d] scandalous matter which
disparage[d] The Unification Church founded by Reverend Sun Myung
Moon."2 "
The examiner contended the mark was "'lacking in taste and is an
affront to [an] organized religious sect."' 21 6  The Trademark Board,
however, noted Moonie(s) may refer either to a member of the Unification
Church or may be used in the context of "exposing one's buttocks."2 "7
Accordingly, when used in connection with a doll, the Trademark Board
208. Id. (The Trademark Board found one dictionary was printed in 1947 and another
dictionary indicated 'ecker" was quickly becoming archaic.).
209. Six articles, from Playboy, Medical Economics, Financial Times, and Newsweek, which
used pecker synonymously with penis.
210. 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
211. Id. at 1471-72. This was supported by the applicant's use of a bird with a large bill in
its mark. Id at 1472. See also In re Leo Quan Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 370, 371 (1978) ("We
are unwilling to assign base motives to an applicant who propounds a plausible explanation for
a trademark which is susceptible to a wholly innocent pronunciation."). A team with a Native
American name would be precluded from prevailing on the argument that their name refers to
something other than Native Americans; a simple visual examination of the team's trademark
would demonstrate this.
212. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653 (1990). Currently the Trademark Board is reviewing a case
involving a red, white, and blue condom. See Application of Old Glory Condom, appealpending,
No. 74-004,391.
213. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653-54.
214. Id. at 1653 n.1 (citing Application Serial No. 755,278 filed Oct. 3, 1988).
215. Id. at 1653.
216. Id. at 1654.
217. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653, 1654.
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believed the second definition would be applicable and not invoke a
reference to members of the Unification Church.
218
In reversing the examiner's denial of registration, the Trademark Board
noted "this is a close case," but reiterated the "guidelines for determining
whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging are 'somewhat vague' and the
'determination [of whether] a mark is scandalous [or disparaging] is
necessarily a highly subjective one.""'219 Therefore, at the initial registra-
tion stage only, the Trademark Board is "inclined to resolve doubts on the
issue whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging in favor of [the]
applicant and pass the mark for publication," knowing an opposition
proceeding may be brought later.'
D. Trademark Cancellation
Cancellation of a federally registered trademark is expressly recognized
in the Lanham Act."' Professor McCarthy refers to the cancellation
process as the "second backstop" to the initial decision by the examin-
er.' Accordingly, if a trademark is improperly registered by the examin-
er and no opposition occurs, a cancellation proceeding provides the
appropriate vehicle to rectify the examiner's error.
The Lanham Act states than an individual who "believes that he is or
will be damaged by the registration [of a trademark]" may bring an action
to cancel a trademark registered on the Principal or Supplemental Regis-
ter.' The individual must file a petition stating the reasons upon which
218. It
219. Id. (quoting In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1471 (1988)). See also
Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc. 6 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1635 (1988) (mark comprised of
defecating dog contained scandalous matter and disparaged Greyhound's running dog mark).
220. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653, 1654 (1990). This is a problematic policy because it shifts
the burden of protecting the public interests away from the Patent and Trademark Office onto the
general public. Professor McCarthy strongly stated:
A company can only oppose if it can afford the luxury of hiring someone to
continually peruse the Official Gazette for published marks ready for registration on
the principal register. The law should not impose on every company the expense of
this searching. A small company may not be able to afford this searching and thus
be unaware of impending registrations which it may wish to oppose.
1 McCARTHY, supra note 8, § 20:20(E) at 1075.
221. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988).
222. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 20:12 at 1048.
223. Title 15, § 1064 governs cancellation of trademarks registered on the Principal Register.
Title 15, § 1092 governs cancellation of trademarks registered on the Supplemental Register.
With the global expansion of American sports (e.g., the World League of American Football), the
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she relies to cancel the trademark, and pay a prescribed fee.m The
content of the petition is governed by the Trademark Rules of Practice of
the United States Patent and Trademark Officer 't A petition to cancel
a trademark must be filed within five years of the date of registration;'
or within five years of the date of publication under 15 U.S.C. §
1062(c);' or at any time if the source of the goods or services is being
misrepresented; or, most importantly for this Article, at any time if the
mark becomes generic, was obtained fraudulently, or is contrary to 15
U.S.C. § 1054 or 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (1), or (c).M
All cancellation proceedings are initially heard by the Trademark
Board. 0 Although the Lanham Act provides for cancellation "in whole
or in part," the Trademark Board may not partially cancel a trademark's
registration." Trademark Board cancellation decisions may be appealed
to either the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or to one of the
United States District Courts. 2 These federal courts have the authority
to cancel federal trademark registrations "in whole or in pare' in actions
"involving a registered trademark." 3 The standard of proof in a cancel-
Supplemental Register may become important. However, this discussion focuses on the
cancellation of marks registered on the Principal Register.
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) may bring an action to cancel a registered
mark on the grounds it violates 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) or (e). Title 15, § 1064 provides that "the
Federal Trade Commission may apply to cancel on the grounds specified in subsections (c) and
(e) of this section any mark registered on the principal register established by this chapter, and
the prescribed fee shall not be required." 15 U.S.C. § 1064. See, e.g., Bart Schwartz Int'l
Textiles, Ltd. v. FTC, 129 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 258 (1961). The proviso of 15 U.S.C. § 1064 which
grants the FrC the authority to represent the public interest would seem to empower the FTC to
bring an action to cancel a mark which was improperly registered under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
224. 15 U.S.C. § 1064.
225. FO Rules of Practice, 37 C.F.R. § 2.112 (1992).
226. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(a).
227. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(2).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).
229. 15 U.S.C. § 1064. Registration may also be canceled under two other conditions. First,
the registration may be canceled if the mark has been registered and not published under 15
U.S.C. § 1062(c). 15 U.S.C. § 1064(4). Second, registration may be canceled at any time in the
case of a certification mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5).
230. 15 U.S.C. § 1067.
231. Title 15, § 1119 provides, in part, that "in any action involving a registered mark the
court may determine the right to registration, order the cancellation of registration, in whole or
in part... ." Selfway, Inc. v. Travelers Petroleum, Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 271, aff' 579
F.2d 75 (C.C.PA. 1978).
232. See supra notes 107-08.
233. 15 U.S.C. § 1119. See Massa v. Jiffy Prod. Co., 240 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 947 (1957).
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lation proceeding is a preponderance of the evidence.2 ' Last, in a
cancellation proceeding, the applicant may assert any of several equitable
defenses. 5  Several casesP" and the leading commentators23  note the
standing requirements of a cancellation proceeding are identical to those of
an opposition proceeding. As the requirements for standing in opposition
proceedings become more liberalized, so do those for cancellation
proceedings."8  The standing requirement is designed to distinguish
between mere intermeddlers and those with a personal interest in the
outcome beyond that of the general public. 9 The petitioner must show
a "real interest" in the proceedings.'
A recent Trademark Board opinion, Bromberg v. Carmel Self Service,
Inc.,." is relevant to the issue of standing in connection with canceling
234. See, e.g., Massey Junior College, Inc. v. Fashion Inst. of Technology, 492 F.2d 1339
(C.C.P.A. 1974). The burden used to be higher in a cancellation proceeding than in an opposition
proceeding. See, e.g., W.D. Byron & Sons, v. Stein Bros Mfg., 377 F.2d 1001 (C.C.P.A. 1967),
overruled by Massey Junior College, Inc. v. Fashion Inst. of Technology, 492 F.2d 1339
(C.C.P.A. 1974).
235. 15 U.S.C. § 1069 (laches, estoppel, and acquiescence). A laches defense would be easily
defeated because 15 U.S.C. § 1063 expressly authorizes a cancellation proceeding "at any time."
See National Serv. Indus. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 68 (1966). The estoppel
doctrine would not be applicable. The acquiescence defense also would fail for the same reason
as the laches defense. In addition, in the case of Native American team names, any equities
weigh heavily in favor of Native Americans because they would be seeking to redress historical
discrimination.
236. See, e.g., Golden Gate Salami Co. v. Gulf States Paper Corp., 332 F.2d 184 (C.C.P.A.
1964); In re Application of Meyers, 201 F.2d 379 (C.C.P.A. 1953).
237. Professor McCarthy states that "standing to cancel is placed on the same basis and
criteria as standing to oppose." 1 McCARTHY, supra note 8, § 20:13 at 1051; accord 1 J.
GILsON, TRADEMARK PROmcrioN & PRAcncE § 3.05[3][a], at 3-158 (1992).
238. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 8, § 20:13 at 1051.
239. See Lipton Indus. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982). See also
International Order of Job's Daughter v. Lindeburg & Co., 727 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Selva
& Sons, Inc. v. Nina Footwear, Inc., 705 F.2d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Golden Gate Salami Co.
v. Gulf States Paper Corp., 332 F.2d 184 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
240. See 727 F.2d at 1092.
241. 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176 (1978). There is a student piece on Bromberg. Kerry L.
Kester, Note, Standing to Oppose Scandalous or Immoral Trademarks, 58 NEB. L. REV. 249
(1979). The Note, though, is poorly reasoned. While the author proposed to narrow the class of
petitioners who meet the standing requirement, this conclusion is in direct contradiction to the
leading cases and commentators in this area, as well as this author's opinion. One of the most
recent pronouncements of the standing requirement by the Trademark Board demonstrates the
Trademark Board is broadening, not narrowing as Kester proposed, the standing requirement. See
Estate of Biro v. Bic Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382, 1385 (1991) ("iThere is a low threshold
for a plaintiff to go from being a mere intermeddler to one with an interest in the proceeding.").
Further, on the facts of Bromberg, the Trademark Board's holding is well reasoned. Kester's
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a Native American team trademark. In Bromberg, registration of the mark
"ONLY A BREAST IN THE MOUTH IS BETTER THAN A LEG IN
THE HAND" was opposed by two women who asserted the mark was
prohibited registration by section 1052(a). 2  Registration of the mark
was sought in connection with restaurant services."
In connection with their opposition petition, the two women filed
several affidavits from women's organizations which supported the
petition's "claim as to the nature of the mark."" Carmel Self Service
moved to dismiss the opposers' petition on the ground that the two women
did not have standing to bring the action.' The trademark owner argued
the women were not involved in "any type of commercial activity,
including the restaurant business"; the affidavits were irrelevant and merely
were an attempt to establish standing; and the pleadings failed to "show
how opposers would be damaged by the registration" of the mark.' The
petitioner urged, inter alia, that the applicant failed to distinguish between
the standing requirements under section 1052(d), which require commercial
activity, and the standing requirements under section 1052(a), which do
not.
2 47
Initially, the Trademark Board made a critical distinction concerning
who may bring an opposition action. The Trademark Board noted 15
U.S.C. § 1063 reads "any person" may file an opposition.2' This
language, the Trademark Board went on to state, expressly forecloses the
inference that the "disgust" of the women in Bromberg fails to meet the standing requirement
trivializes the damage sexism causes.
242. 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 177. The two women asserted the mark
comprises immoral and scandalous matter, is disparaging to all people of a specific
class, and in particular, women, in that it has false connotations and brings
individuals, especially women, into contempt and disrepute; that the obvious double
entendre of the mark indicates that it is lewd, lascivious, indecent, obscene,
worthless, depraved, chauvinistic, degrading, and has no commercial value, and that
the granting of a registration therefor unnecessarily lowers the standards of the
United States Government in particular, the United States Patent Office [sic].
Id The applicant's mark was successfully opposed on other grounds. See Golden Skillet Corp.
v. Carmel Self Serv., Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 790 (1979).
243. 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 177.
244. Id Affidavits expressing support were made by Chicagoland Women's Federal Credit
Union, the executive and managing editors of She Publications, Ltd., and Women in Management.
See Notice of Opposition at 2, Bromberg v. Carmel Self Serv., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176
(1978) (Opp. No. 59,979).
245. 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 177-78.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 178.
248. 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (emphasis added).
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possibility of a class action suit.2 ' 9 Therefore, until an individual "pays
a filing fee and [is] identified as an opposer," she is not entitled to stand-
ing
2 50
The Trademark Board then concluded section 1052(a) does not require
"commercial damage" to satisfy the standing requirement:
[NIormally an opposition to the registration of a trademark
is filed by a commercial enterprise seeking to preserve and
protect an economic interest. The Trademark Act, however,
makes it clear that one need not be a commercial enterprise, nor
is it necessary that a commercial interest be at stake for one to
object to a trademark registration.
Thus the fact that opposers have not based their claim of
damage on their involvement in a commercial activity is not fatal
to the question of standing. Rather, as indicated by the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals ... "a party has standing to oppose
within the meaning of Section 13 if that party can demonstrate a
real interest in the proceeding."''
In finding the two women did have standing, the Trademark Board held,
"the instant opposers who are persons within the meaning of section 1372
and members of a group who may believe the mark to be scandalous have
the requisite standing to be heard on the question before us."' 3
E. The Effect of Cancellation and
the Principles of Common Law Trademark
Federal legislation which permits canceling the registration of an
immoral, scandalous, or disparaging trademark would appear to raise
serious First Amendment questions.' The owner of a challenged
trademark might accuse opponents of blatant censorship. However, this
argument would fail to distinguish between a person's First Amendment
249. 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 178.
250. Id
251. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 192
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 24 (1976)). See also Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Rexall Drug and Chem. Co., 174
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 458 (1972).
252. Section 13 is synonymous with 15 U.S.C. § 1063.
253. 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 179.
254. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech.... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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rights to use the mark"5 and the rights inherent in trademark registra-
tion.2m Cancellation of a trademark's federal registration does not
deprive the trademark holder of the use of the trademark, it merely deprives
the holder of the benefits of federal registration.' Therefore, an athletic
team with a Native American name could continue to use its name but
would retain no rights to enforce the name under federal law."5
Although a trademark may not meet the requirements of federal
protection, through sustained use a trademark may achieve common law
protection." Common law trademark rights can arise prior to federal
registration,' and can exist after federal registration has expired261 or
after federal registration has been canceled. 262 A team whose trademark
has been canceled because the mark was found to violate section 1052(a)
may try to rely on common law trademark to protect its mark. Despite the
loss of federal protection, a common law trademark holder would not be
deprived of any protections which would be available under a common law
theory. 3 These protections include the right to enforce the validity of the
255. In two instances involving the "Sambo's" trademark, efforts to prohibit use of the mark
violated the owner's First Amendment rights. See Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann
Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 695 (6th Cir. 1981) (held "Sambo's" is protected commercial free speech);
Sambo's of Ohio v. City Council of Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177, 180 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (held action
by City Council violated Sambo's First Amendment rights and "the exclusive remedy for
preventing the use of such trade names is under the provisions of [15 U.S.C.] § 1064, which
provides a method for canceling a registration which has been made 'contrary to law"').
256. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
257. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1987); In
re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Hammermill Paper Co. v. Gulf States Paper Corp.,
337 F.2d 662 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
258. The economic reality is that lack of protection is synonymous with lack of use due to
a loss of revenue. Indeed, cancellation would appear a motivational factor for teams to rapidly
market their new marks to dry up the black market which may emerge for their the old names.
259. See United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); La Societe Anonyme des Parfums
Le Galion v. lean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1974).
260. See Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 541 (2d Cir.
1956).
261. See United States Jaycees v. San Francisco Junior Chamber of Commerce, 354 F. Supp.
61 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Phoenix Mfg. Co. v. Plymouth Mfg. Co., 286 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D. Mass.
1968).
262. See Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938);
National Trailways Bus Sys. v. Trailway Van Lines, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 352,357 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
263. See RESTATEMENT (FIRSr) Op TORTs § 715 cmt. f (1938) ("[R]egistration is not required
and trade-marks may be protected though they are not registered.").
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trademark through an action for infringement.2"64
However, common law trademark does not protect matter which is
prohibited by section 1052(a). While there are no cases on point, the
American Law Institute Restatement (First) of Torts ("Restatement") is a
useful tool in determining what the common law will protect. The
Restatement contains sections applicable to trademarks' and provides the
common law definition of trademark:
A trademark is any mark, word, letter, number, design, picture or
combination thereof in any form of arrangement, which
(a) is adopted and used by a person to denominate goods which
he markets, and
(d) the use of which for the purpose stated in Clause (a) is
prohibited neither by legislative enactment nor by an otherwise
defined public policy.266
The Restatement provides, "A designation cannot be a trade-mark or trade
name if it is scandalous or indecent, or otherwise violates a defined public
policy."' 7 The comments to this Restatement section provide that matter
which "violates accepted standards of decency or a defined public policy"
is not a trademark or tradename.2"
Perhaps there is nothing more indecent than racism and certainly,
under any administration, it is a defined public policy to redress discrimi-
nation. Prior federal registration cannot be twisted into a pronouncement
of an unbridled right of common law protection. Common law protection
will only exist if the matter in question meets the common law require-
ments necessary to establish a trademark.
264. See, e.g., Sterling Drug Inc. v. Lincoln Lab., Inc., 322 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1963). Recall
that this protection is important to teams because it enables them to prevent unlicensed use of
their marks.
265. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 715.40, 744-56 (1938).
266. I& § 715 (emphasis added). Comment c discusses three categories of inappropriate
trade-mark subject matter:
The third category of designations which are inappropriate for use as
trademarks comprises those which may not be so used because of the prohibitions
of a legislative enactment or of an otherwise defined public policy. Thus legislation
prohibits the use as a trade-mark of the Red Cross in a white background, or of the
American Flag.
267. Id § 726.
268. 1& § 726 cmt. a. For example, a picture of a man shooting at the back of a police
officer with the words 'Kill the Tyrants" imprinted above the picture would not be recognized
as a trademark or tradename under this section. Id
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VI. APPUCATION oF 15 U.S.C. SECnONS 1064 AND 1052(A) TO
NATIVE AMERICAN TEAM NAMES
A. Standing to Cancel Under 15 U.S.C. Section 1064
One issue the Trademark Board or a court will have to determine is
whether a Native American has standing to challenge the mark in question.
Applying the requirements established in Bromberg, it appears a Native
American would have standing under section 1064 to cancel a Native
American team trademark. 9 Because Native American team names are
an affront to a Native American's dignity, a Native American would not be
a "mere intermeddler,"270 but would be able to establish a "real inter-
est!'" 1 in the proceedings. Just as two women had standing to oppose a
sexist mark,' a Native American would have standing to cancel a racist
mark. The mark's de-humanizing effect, aside from any "economic
damage," is sufficient to grant standing to a Native American petitioner.
Further, applying the guidelines established in the Restatement, once federal
registration is canceled, a Native American team name is also not entitled
to common law protection. 3
269. In Bromberg, the Trademark Board provided important pearls of wisdom to heed in
choosing the "perfect plaintiff." First, a "corporation or other commercial enterprise" is less likely
to have the "emotional characteristics requisite to being or feeling offended by that which may
be considered scandalous." Bromberg, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 178-79. This appears applicable
to any argument raising the other prohibitions of 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). Second, the Trademark
Board notes "one or severar' members of a "certain segment of the public," who can demonstrate
a real interest, may obtain standing. Id. (emphasis added). While safety is in numbers, litigation
costs may limit the number of cancellation proceedings brought. Third, "an examiner cannot be
expected to be aware of the significance of all marks before him as to all individuals, groups,
organizations, orders, etc." I. Therefore, one needs to bring the offensive nature of a mark to
the examiner's attention before anything can be done about it. Last, to overcome the standing
requirement, a petitioner need not prove damages. I4 However, once the petitioner demonstrated
standing, she should be prepared to present a compelling case.
A final thought, when choosing the "perfect plaintiff' one should pay close attention to
which court will have appellate jurisdiction. The plaintiff need not live in the same city as the
team whose trademark is in question because a sports team's name is prominent outside the city
where the team plays. This gives a resourceful attorney the option of choosing a plaintiff who
lives in a jurisdiction with precedents which might favor a Native American plaintiff.
270. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
273. If a Native American trademark is canceled because it is prohibited by 15 U.S.C. §
1052(a), an additional theory to research is whether a Trademark Board or court decision would
have a collateral estoppel effect in a suit for defamation against the owner of the trademark. This
theory may be a way for Native Americans to not only foreclose future use of the trademark, but
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B. Prohibited Subject Matter Under 15 U.s.C. Section 1052(a)
Once standing has been established, the focus of the Trademark Board
or a court will be whether the trademark in question violates one or more
of the prohibitions of the Lanham Act. Applying Trademark Board and
judicial interpretations of section 1052(a), Native American team names are
prohibited from retaining federal registration because they: (1) are
immoral; (2) are scandalous; (3) disparage Native Americans; (4) disparage
Native American beliefs; (5) bring Native Americans into contempt; and (6)
bring Native Americans into disrepute. 4
1. Substantial Composite of the General Public
In its examination of the challenged trademark, the Trademark Board
or a court will determine whether the McGinley court's "substantial
composite of the general public" 5 standard has been satisfied. Applica-
tion of this standard is more pragmatic than a literal interpretation would
suggest. Accordingly, a "substantial composite?' of Native Americans
would appear to satisfy the standard.
When the McGinley court stated the "substantial composite" standard,
it relied on an earlier standard announced in Riverbank Canning. Cases
subsequent to Riverbank Canning, yet prior to McGinley, should be
understood as applying the same standard which McGinley restates. For
example, in Reentsma Cigarettenfabriken the Trademark Board denied
registration to a mark because it was disparaging and scandalous to an
obscure sect of Muslims.2 6 The Encyclopaedia Britannica, relied on by
the Trademark Board in that case, states the sect had only a few members
at the time the mark was denied.' Because the Trademark Board was
also recover monetary damages for approximately a century of injury. It appears, even under
what the leading treatise on tort law refers to as "too narrow" a definition of defamation, Native
American team names are defamatory. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAw OF ToRTs § 111, at 773 n.17 (5th ed. 1984) ("words which tend to expose one to
public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism,
degradation or disgrace"). See also RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). Cf.
Delgado, supra note 186, at 133 (proposing a new tort action).
274. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). Most of the arguments in this section of the Article are applicable
to more than one prohibition. Once again, the most effective combination of arguments in a given
case is for the individual attorney to determine.
275. See supra note 200 and accompanying text
276. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
277. Cf. 20 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRTANNIcA 333 (1952).
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applying the same standard the McGinley court applied, it appears that even
members of a small group could satisfy the "substantial composite"
standard.
The owner of a challenged trademark might contend that the "substan-
tial composite" standard represents a combination of two distinct standards
found in Riverbank Canning. Arguably, if there were two distinct
standards, the Riverbank Canning decision would require the Trademark
Board or a court to determine whether the challenged trademark was, for
example: (1) disparaging to "nearly all" Native Americans and; (2)
disparaging to "many" Americans. 278
This interpretation not only would be erroneous, it also would
completely disregard the Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken, Sociede Agricola,
and Runsdorf decisions. The Bromberg court expressly recognized the
implications of these past decisions, "[These cases and Riverbank Canning
represent decisions where] marks have been refused registration by the
examiner on the ground that they were offensive to a certain segment of the
public." 9  It is Native Americans alone, not American society as a
whole, who should comprise the relevant "public" and determine whether
Native American team names are offensive. If this were not true, our
society would revisit an era where racial inequality flourished.'
2. Immoral
Native American team names are immoral because they deprive Native
Americans of their opportunity for self-determination. While Native
Americans have not asked to be defined, athletic teams have done just that
by labelling and depicting Native Americans in a virulent manner. Because
race is an immutable characteristic, Native Americans are constrained by
these stereotypical portrayals. Until these team names are abolished, Native
Americans will continue to be associated with images and representations
which malign them.
278. In re Riverbank Canning, 95 F.2d 327, 329 (C.C.PA. 1938).
279. 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 179 (emphasis added).
280. Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) ("We consider the underlying fallacy
of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it.") (emphasis added).
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3. Scandalous
Native American team names also satisfy the definition of scandalous
established in Riverbank Canning."5  The Concise Oxford Dictionary
defines "redskin" as "colloq. offens. an American Indian."' m In addition,
"Indian" encompasses references to Native Americans as heathens or
savages.' Native American team names are disgraceful, are offensive
to one's conscience, and shock an enlightened society's sense of truth,
decency, and propriety.
4. Disparagement, Contempt, and Disrepute
Native American team names are also disparaging and bring Native
Americans into contempt and disrepute. The Random House Dictionary
defines "redskin" as "slang (often disparaging and offensive) A Native
American Indian."' Professor Coakley of the Center for the Study of
Sport and Leisure at the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs adds:
To many Native Americans, redskin is as derogatory as 'nigger'
is for black Americans. It is symbolic of such racism that the
capitol city of the government that once put bounties on the lives
of native peoples has a football team named the Redskins. It
symbolizes a continuing lack of understanding of the complex
and diverse cultures and the heritage of native peoples and is
offensive to anyone aware of the history of native peoples in
North America.'
Regardless of the setting in which a Native American team name
281. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
282. THE CONCISE OXFORD DICiONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 1006 (8th ed. 1990).
"Redskin" is also found in dictionaries devoted to slang. See, e.g., RICHARD A. SPEARS, SLANG
& EUPHEMISM: A DICTIONARY OF OATHS, CURSES, INSULTS, SEXUAL SLANG AND METAPHOR,
RACIAL SLURS, DRUG TALK, HOMOSEXUAL LINGO AND RELATED MATrERs 327 (1981) ("A
North American Indian. Sometimes derogatory. [colloquial since the late 1600's] Synonyms:
BOW AND ARROW, BREED, BUCK, INJUN, UNCLE TOMMYHAWK, VANISHING
AvERICAN").
283. A "heathen" is "one who adheres to the religion of a tribe or nation that does not
acknowledge the God of Judaism, Christianity, or Islam." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 600 (1979). See generally ROY HARVEY PEARCE, SAVAGISM AND
CWILIZA11ON: A STUDY OF THE INDIAN AND THE AMERICAN MIND (1988).
284. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1618 (2d ed. unabridged
1987).
285. See JAY J. COAKLEY, SPORT IN Soc1ETY: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 206-07 (4th ed.
1990).
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appears or whether the name is directed at an individual or a group, it is
disparaging and promotes racial insensitivity. Because of the popularity of
sports in our society and the large number of Native American team names
in use, Native American team names appear frequently in both public and
private settings. As a result, Americans are constantly being exposed to
racist portrayals of Native Americans. This exposure has a pervasive
effect on societal attitudes concerning Native Americans.
When considering the offensive nature of Native American team
names, one must consider the historically appalling treatment of Native
Americans in the United States. The dramatic difference in the
treatment of Native Americans when Native American team names were
first adopted and today illustrates another reason to change these
names."s Too often, depictions associate Native Americans with images
formulated during frontier settlement. Two authors explain, "The use of the
Indian symbol as a team mascot is offensive to American Indians because
only the qualities of the warrior role are emphasized. The stereotypical
image projected by the mascot serves to perpetuate a negative aspect of the
American Indian...."25 9
Stereotypical representations have a pernicious effect and erode the
foundations of equality. This is due, in large part, to their effect of
undermining Native American self-esteem. The devastating effect is
apparent. Citing the low level of Native American participation in sports,
Professor Coakley asserts:
For the young [Native American attending schools or
watching games between schools with team names like Indians,
286. Disturbingly, as American sports becomes more widely disseminated throughout the
world, we spread these racist portrayals and attitudes to other countries and peoples.
287. See generally VINE DELORIA AND CLIFFORD M. LYLFt, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN
JusTicE (1990). In addition, the two leading commentaries on Native American law are FELIX
S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw (1986) and CHARES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN
INDIANS, TVM, AND THE LAW (1987).
288. The Michigan Commission noted, "Unfortunately, there are many images of Native
American people which are based on Indian people of several hundred years ago or upon popular
misunderstanding of diverse Indian culture; language and the history of Indian people. As a
society, we accept images of Indian people which are of a single warlike group frozen in time."
MICHIGAN COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 1. See, e.g., JOHN CLARK RIDPATH, A POPULAR
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM ABORIGINAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY
41-50 (1882) (One of the "propensities of the Red men was the passion for war... Fighting was
limited to surprise, the ambuscade, the massacre; and military strategy consisted of cunning and
treachery."). Id at 44-45.
289. John R. Fuller & Elisabeth Anne Manning, Violence and Sexism in College Mascots and
Symbols: A Typology, 15 FREE INQUIRY IN CREATIVE SOCIETY 61 (1987).
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Redskins, and Savages, and with mascots who run around and
mimic white stereotypes of 'Indian' behavior, playing sports
involves giving up much more than half their soul. 9°  When
they see a distorted or historically inappropriate caricature of a
[Native American on a gym wall of a school that doesn't even
try to increase student awareness of the cultures of local native
peoples, it means swallowing cultural pride, repressing anger
against insensitive, historically ignorant whites, and giving up
hope of being understood in terms of their own feelings and
cultural heritage."'
Further, these names are viewed by our children who are formulating not
only their values, but also their prejudices.2' By discriminating in
athletics, teams are contributing to societal discrimination against Native
Americans as well as fostering latent racism in future generations.
5. Disparagement of Religious Beliefs
Native American team names disparage Native American beliefs. The
Michigan Commission concluded:
The most commonly used symbol of Indians which is found
in logos and mascot dress is the eagle feather. In Michigan
Indian culture, the eagle feather [is] sacred and a great honor to
receive. In the same way, the Sioux headdress is only worn in
ceremonies by persons who have earned the honor of doing so.
Current use of the feather trivializes and degrades the
significance placed on the feather by Indian people.
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Tim Giago elaborated in an editorial:
The sham rituals, such as the wearing of feathers, smoking
of so-called peace pipes, beating of tom-toms, fake dances,
horrendous attempts at singing Indian songs, so-called war
whoops, and the painted faces, address more than the issue of
290. Coakley earlier quoted runner Billy Mills, an Olympic gold medal winner, who stated
in regard to his training: "[To become part of white society you give up half your soul."
291. See COAKLEY, supra note 285, at 205. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494
(1954) ("To separate [Negro children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
292. See ARLENE B. HiRscHENFELDER, AMERICAN INDAN STEREOTYPES IN THE WORLD OF
CHILDREN: A READER AND BiBLIOGRAPHY (1982); Jesus Garcia, Native Americans in U.S.
History Textbooks: From Bloody Savages to Heroic Chiefs, 17 J. AM. INDIAN EDUC. 15 (1978).
293. MICHIGAN COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 26-27.
NATIVE AMERICAN TEAM NAMES
racism. They are direct attacks upon the spirituality (religion) of
the Indian people.2u
Just as the Trademark Board held the use of the Senussi name in connec-
tion with cigarettes disparaged Senussi beliefs,295 they should also find
Native American team names disparage Native American beliefs.
Because discriminatory practices are clandestine, they are often
difficult to observe and eliminate. Once identified, though, these practices
can be confronted and changed. In the case of Native American team
names, their discriminatory nature is apparent and unmistakable. Teams are
not trying to conceal their discriminatory practices, rather they are openly
exploiting their disregard of Native Americans. There is no excuse for
overlooking discrimination which is so conspicuous. By allowing the
continued registration of Native American team names, the federal
government is enabling a trademark owner to profit at the detrimental
expense of its citizens.
VII. CONCLUSION
Regrettably, Native American team names were granted federal
trademark protection. Athletic team names should not comprise images and
names which pertain to race. Race-neutral names are easily fancied and are
afforded federal trademark protection.
The present images are contrary to progressive social norms and
practices and their use should be voluntarily discontinued. This is not a
plea to conform to notions of "political correctness," but rather a request to
respond to societal maturation. A team's refusal to change its Native
American name is a somber reminder that blatant racism and prejudice still
exist.
This Article confidently places the ball in the Native Americans' court.
Albeit a step in the appropriate direction, the current efforts to eliminate
Native American team names are inadequate to properly address this
problem. Today, Native Americans need to focus their resentment and
obtain a judicial resolution of this issue under the Lanham Act 2 By
294. Tim Giago, Mascots, Spirituality and Insensitivity, LAKOTA TIMES, Oct. 23, 1991, at B7.
295. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
296. Since this Article was written, Native Americans have done just this, filing a cancellation
proceeding with the Trademark Board. See Leonard Shapiro, Native American Coalition Files
Action on Redskins, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1992, at Cl. The case was taken on a pro bono
arrangement by the Minneapolis based law firm of Dorsey & Whitney. The lead attorney on the
case is Stephen Baird.
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depriving team owners of the financial return a team's trademarks provide,
Native Americans will compel owners to acknowledge the reality of their
racist team names.
